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An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory

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An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory
An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory.jpg
Author Alasdair Cochrane
Country United Kingdom
Language English
Series The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series
Subject Animal ethics
Political theory
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan
Publication date
13 October 2010 (2010-10-13)
Pages 176+vii
ISBN 9780230239258

An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory is a 2010 book by political theorist Alasdair Cochrane, published by Palgrave Macmillan as part of its Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. It examines five schools of political theoryutilitarianism, liberalism, communitarianism, Marxism and feminism—and their relationship with the question of animal rights. Cochrane concludes that each tradition has something to offer, but ultimately presents his own account, based primarily on liberalism and utilitarianism.

The book was reviewed in several academic publications and was received positively by the reviewers, including philosopher Steve Cooke and political theorist Robert Garner. Cooke said that Cochrane's own approach showed promise, but the book would have benefited from devoting more space to it; Garner praised Cochrane's synthesis of such a broad range of literature, but argued that the work was too uncritical of the concept of justice as it might apply to animals. Cochrane's account of interest-based rights for animals is considered at greater length in his 2012 book Animal Rights without Liberation.

Background

In the 1990s and 2000s Cochrane studied politics at the University of Sheffield and the London School of Economics (LSE), before becoming a fellow and lecturer at LSE. An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory was his first book,[1] though he had previously had articles published in Utilitas and Political Studies introducing his interest-based theory of animal rights.[2] Cochrane's article in Political Studies provoked responses from political theorist Robert Garner and philosopher John Hadley, published in 2011 and 2013 respectively.[3] Garner subsequently acted as a discussant for Cochrane during the writing of An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory.[4]

The book was first published in the UK on 13 October 2010 by Palgrave Macmillan in paperback and hardback.[5] It was the first book to appear as part of the Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series,[6] a partnership between Palgrave Macmillan and the Ferrata Mora Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. The series's general editors are Andrew Linzey and Priscilla N. Cohn.[7] The book was described by the Centre as "the first introductory level text to offer an accessible overview on the status of animals in contemporary political theory."[8] It was one of the first works to link the question of animal rights to the concept of justice in political philosophy. Previous publications examining animals and theories of justice include works by Garner and Martha Nussbaum.[9][10][11]

Synopsis

Alasdair Cochrane, pictured in 2013

An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory begins by discussing the history of animals in political theory before considering the approaches taken by five schools of political theory: utilitarianism, liberalism, communitarianism, Marxism and feminism. The final chapter outlines Cochrane's own approach, which he situates between liberalism and utilitarianism.[12]

Opening chapters

After introducing the purpose of the book, establishing it as a work of normative political theory asking to what extent animals should be included in the domain of justice,[13] Cochrane considers the history of thinking on the relationship between justice and animals. He notes that within ancient philosophy there was disagreement about the inclusion of animals within accounts of justice, in medieval Christian philosophy there was a consensus that they should be excluded, and in modern philosophy there has been a return to disagreement.[14]

Utilitarianism

Chapter three considers utilitarianism. Cochrane describes utilitarianism as important historically for animals and argues that its focus on welfare and sentience, and its egalitarian nature, are strengths.[15] The ideas of Peter Singer are outlined, after which Cochrane defends the account against arguments in defence of speciesism and against critics such as R. G. Frey (1941–2012), who maintained that animals do not have interests.[16] He then considers utilitarian critics of Singer, who argue that meat-eating maximises utility, even when animal interests are taken into account. This leads to the criticism that judging the best consequences is an extremely difficult task for political communities, but Cochrane concludes that a utilitarian consensus does support the abolition of factory farming, regardless of the alternative.[17] Finally, he addresses critics who argue that Singer's position offers insufficient protection for animals. Nussbaum's argument that animals can suffer unfelt harms is considered, as is Tom Regan's position that, according to Singer's account, animals are protected only insofar as their protection maximises welfare, rather than in their own right.[18]

Liberalism

Chapter four considers liberalism. Cochrane focuses primarily upon John Rawls, whose contractarian account offers two reasons for the rejection of animals: questions of reciprocity, for which animals are ill-suited, and questions of personhood, as all parties to the contract must be moral persons.[19] Cochrane criticises Rawls's rejection of animals,[20] before identifying the risks to animals inherent within liberal pluralism.[21] The possibility of a Rawlsian account including animals, such as those offered by Donald VanDeVeer and Mark Rowlands, is considered and rejected; Cochrane outlines problems with placing questions of species membership behind the veil of ignorance and outlines Garner's fundamental criticisms of Rawls.[22] Modified versions of personhood that include animals are discussed. Cochrane closes the chapter by arguing that personhood and welfare should both be considered important; in so doing, he points towards his own conception of justice for animals.[23]

Communitarianism

Chapter five assesses the relationship between animals and communitarianism. Cochrane initially argues that communtarianism, using British society as an example, can be used to expand justice to animals.[24] He devotes the remainder of the chapter to four arguments against this line of thought. First, communitarianism is particularist; that is, the principles it expounds are wholly contingent on the values in the particular society.[25] Second, there are difficulties inherent in finding "authentic" values within a given society.[26] Third, societies often favour some animals over others, leaving unfavoured animals vulnerable.[27] Fourth, there is the question of whose values within a society matter: states often contain multiple communities with very different attitudes to animals. Consideration of this fourth question involves analysis of multiculturalism.[28]

Marxism

Cochrane goes on, in chapter six, to consider Marxism. He outlines the discontinuities between humans and animals that exist for Karl Marx and considers the extent to which animal-rights thinking is an example of bourgeois morality. These analyses serve to illustrate how Marxist thinking can be used to exclude animals, but counterarguments are offered.[29] Cochrane then draws upon Catherine Perlow and Barbara Noske, who have argued that animals may represent an exploited group in a Marxist sense, but he is critical of the argument that this exploitation is caused by capitalism and that overthrowing capitalism would be a necessary step for achieving justice.[30] He next considers David Sztybel and Ted Benton, who have drawn upon the adage of "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" in relation to animals; Cochrane is wary about the use of the phrase for three reasons. First, it is unclear how central the idea is to Marxist thought; second, it is a principle only for societies in advanced stages of communism; and third, even if we assume we can know the needs of animals, it assumes that we should extend justice beyond sentient animals.[31] Finally, Cochrane considers Benton's proposal that liberal rights-based approaches to animal justice cannot achieve their goal, and that Marxism can be used as a resource for political achievement. This is, for Cochrane, Marxism's most important contribution in the area.[32]

Feminism

Cochrane considers but rejects the arguments of Carol J. Adams (pictured) that the oppression of women and of animals is linked through the cultural practice of meat-eating.

Cochrane considers feminism, the final tradition he examines, in chapter seven. As with Marxism, there are historical links between feminism and animal liberation.[33] Cochrane considers but rejects four ways in which the oppression of women and of animals may be linked. First is the idea, taken from ecofeminist theorists, that domination of women and domination of animals are both due to an ideal of domination over nature. Second is Carol J. Adams's argument that exaltation of meat-eating serves to oppress women. Third is through the use of language. For example, some animal names (such as cow, bitch and dog) are used as forms of abuse against women; these and other linguistic norms serve to reinforce the oppression of women and of animals. Fourth is the way that both animals and women are objectified, treated as mere things to be used towards the ends of others. Cochrane concedes that there are striking parallels but argues that the oppression of women and animals are not necessarily linked.[34] Next, the author considers the criticism of reason-based approaches to animal liberation, epitomised for Cochrane by Singer and Regan, from thinkers supportive of feminist care-based approaches,[35] before outlining and rejecting an emotionally driven, care-based approach to animal justice.[36] Of all the traditions considered in the book, Cochrane is most critical of feminism.[37]

Conclusion

In the final chapter Cochrane argues that each school has an important contribution to make to animal justice, particularly liberalism and utilitarianism. He then outlines his own approach.[38] He writes that, while talk of our political and moral obligations to animals is today more prominent than ever, it remains on the periphery of mainstream dialogue in political theory. He closes by arguing that, if the book's claims are correct, treatment of animals should be considered one of the most pressing political questions today.[39]

Central argument

Cochrane argues that while each of the schools of thought he has considered has problems, they all have something important to contribute to the debate. Utilitarianism's most important contribution is its focus on sentience, but its major failing is its lack of respect for individuals. The most important contribution from liberalism is the centrality of the individual. Communitarianism, though it is too ready to attribute cohesion to the values of a given society, makes an important contribution by observing that individuals can flourish only within appropriate communities, and by stressing the importance of changing the views of society at large. This latter idea is shared by Marxism, which further offers the contribution that legal change does not necessarily equate to effective change. While Cochrane does not share the idea that capitalism must be overthrown, he recognises that "fundamental shifts in the organisation, norms and institutions of society" are needed for justice to be extended to animals. Care-based feminist approaches, despite Cochrane's criticism, remind us that emotions and sympathy should not be ignored.[40]

Cochrane's own sympathies lie most strongly with utilitarianism and liberalism; his own account is most influenced by them.[9] He argues that rights derived from considerations of interests can protect individual animals and place limits on what can be done to them. These rights cannot be violated, even in the name of the greater good, which means that the cultural and economic practices of human beings will be affected. Anticipating criticism, Cochrane explains that not every interest leads to a right. A full consideration of this argument is outside the scope of the book.[41] The argument was expanded in Cochrane's Animal Rights without Liberation (2012) which, though published after An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory, was based on Cochrane's doctoral thesis.[42]

Reception

Robert Garner, 2013

An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory was reviewed by Garner for the Journal of Animal Ethics, University of Manchester-based philosopher Steve Cooke for the Political Studies Review and Richard Seymour, an LSE sociologist, for the LSE Review of Books. All three reviewers were broadly positive towards the work. Cooke recommended it for "readers interested both in the moral and political standing of animals and in political theory in general", the latter group because the work's methodological approach allows it to serve as a good introduction to political theory generally.[12] Seymour considered the book a "refreshing and comprehensive overview of a highly interesting issue".[43] Garner said that the book came "highly recommended"; he considered it "a very fine book", in which "Cochrane expertly simplifies and synthesizes a huge and complex literature in the limited space available to him, while retaining high scholarly standards". Garner also praised the fact that the book remained interesting, unlike many textbooks.[9]

Cooke considered Cochrane's own account to be "interesting and worthy of further consideration" and found his supporting arguments to be "convincing", but he worried that the account was not considered in the depth it warranted. He wrote that An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory would have benefited if more space had been given to the interest-based account. Further, Cooke noted that, in covering such a wide array of positions, Cochrane had to sacrifice depth of argument; Cooke considered this unproblematic, as readers could easily follow up the thinkers cited.[12] Seymour was particularly critical of Cochrane's coverage of feminism, which was, for him, "an unfortunate lapse in an otherwise fascinating review". Seymour argued that Cochrane's critique was superficial or "[missed] the point entirely". Instead, he suggested, feminist approaches provide a potentially highly productive approach to the subject.[43]

In response to An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory, Garner raised two themes, the first of which was the use of the concept of justice.[37] Agreeing with Cochrane that the concept is the defining feature of a political account, as opposed to more general accounts of animal ethics, Garner nevertheless finds Cochrane's account of justice to be "too broad and loose".[37] In the book, Cochrane considers justice for animals to be "about recognising that the treatment of animals is a matter for political communities to enforce" and "recognising that the treatment of animals is something that political communities ought to enforce for the sake of animals themselves".[44] For Garner,

The problem with this is that it arguably includes too much—for it implies that once the state recognizes that we have direct duties to animals, that what we do to them matters to them, then the demands of justice are met. This means that, with the exception of those who hold that we have only indirect duties to animals, all the traditions that Cochrane discusses can lay claim to offering a theory of justice for animals.[37]

Further, Garner suggests that Cochrane is "perhaps unduly uncritical of the utility of employing justice as a means to protect the interests of animals".[37] He outlines two ways that animals might be protected without being the recipients of justice; first, they may be owed direct duties outside of justice, or, second, they might be protected by means of indirect duties, meaning that they are protected because of what humans owe to one another.[45] Despite raising these themes in his review of An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory, Garner later rejected both possibilities in his own work, arguing that animals should be considered recipients of justice.[46]

The second theme Garner identified was the divide between ideal and nonideal theory,[37] which he understands as a way political theory may be used to contextualise animal ethics and further the debate.[47] The themes of this review were built upon in Garner's 2013 book A Theory of Justice for Animals.[48] In the course of the review, he looked forward[49] to the release of Animal Rights without Liberation, Cochrane's second book, a defence of the interest-based rights theory.[50] For Garner, Cochrane's theory serves as a challenge to abolitionism, which, Garner fears, both polarises the debate and is unrealistic.[51]

Releases

The book is available in paperback and hardback.[5]

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References

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  2. Cochrane 2009a; Cochrane 2009b.
  3. Garner 2011; Hadley 2013.
  4. Cochrane 2010, p. viii.
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  6. Cochrane 2010, p. i.
  7. Cochrane 2010, pp. vi–vii.
  8. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  9. 9.0 9.1 9.2 Garner 2012, p. 98.
  10. Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2012, p. 1.
  11. Garner 2013, pp. 1, 169.
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 Cooke 2012, p. 95.
  13. Cochrane 2010, pp. 2–3.
  14. Cochrane 2010, p. 10.
  15. Cochrane 2010, pp. 29–31.
  16. Cochrane 2010, pp. 31–8.
  17. Cochrane 2010, pp. 38–42.
  18. Cochrane 2010, pp. 42–8.
  19. Cochrane 2010, pp. 53–6.
  20. Cochrane 2010, pp. 56–60.
  21. Cochrane 2010, pp. 60–61.
  22. Cochrane 2010, pp. 61–5.
  23. Cochrane 2010, pp. 65–70.
  24. Cochrane 2010, pp. 75–6.
  25. Cochrane 2010, p. 76.
  26. Cochrane 2010, p. 79.
  27. Cochrane 2010, p. 81.
  28. Cochrane 2010, pp. 85–91.
  29. Cochrane 2010, pp. 96–105.
  30. Cochrane 2010, pp. 105–8.
  31. Cochrane 2010, pp. 108–12.
  32. Cochrane 2010, pp. 112–3.
  33. Cochrane 2010, p. 115.
  34. Cochrane 2010, pp. 117–23.
  35. Cochrane 2010, pp. 123–30.
  36. Cochrane 2010, pp. 130–34.
  37. 37.0 37.1 37.2 37.3 37.4 37.5 Garner 2012, p. 99.
  38. Cochrane 2010, pp. 136–45.
  39. Cochrane 2010, pp. 145–6.
  40. Cochrane 2010, pp. 136–41.
  41. Cochrane 2010, pp. 141–5.
  42. Cochrane 2012, p. vii.
  43. 43.0 43.1 Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  44. Cochrane 2010, p. 3.
  45. Garner 2012, pp. 99-100.
  46. Garner 2013, pp. 44-75.
  47. Garner 2012, p. 100.
  48. Garner 2013.
  49. Garner 2012, pp. 101-2.
  50. Cochrane 2012.
  51. Garner 2012, pp. 100, 102-3.

Bibliography

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