Biotechnology risk

Biotechnology risk is a form of existential risk that could come from biological sources, such as genetically engineered biological agents. These can come either intentionally (in the form of bioterrorism/biological weapons) or unintentionally (through the accidental release of engineerer viruses). A chapter in biotechnology and biosecurity was published in Nick Bostrom's Global Catastrophic Risks, which covered risks such as viral agents. Since then, new technologies like CRISPR and gene drives have been introduced.

While the ability to deliberately engineer pathogens has been constrained to high-end labs run by top researchers, the technology to achieve this (and other astonishing feats of bioengineering) is rapidly becoming cheaper and more widespread. Such examples include the diminishing cost of sequencing the human genome (from $10M USD to $1000), the accumulation of large datasets of genetic information, the discovery of gene drives, and the discovery of CRISPR.

Genetically modified viruses

See also: Genetically modified virus

It has been hypothesized that there is an upper bound on the virulence (deadliness) of naturally occurring pathogens. But pathogens may be intentionally or unintentionally genetically modified to change virulence and other characteristics. A group of Australian researchers unintentionally changed characteristics of the mousepox virus while trying to develop a virus to sterilize rodents. The modified virus became highly lethal even in vaccinated and naturally resistant mice. The technological means to genetically modify virus characteristics are likely to become more widely available in the future if not properly regulated.

Many scientists have engineered viruses (like the flu) in order to study them more closely. In summer 2011, laboratories published reports of flu viruses related to avian flu that have been deliberately modified to become transmissible through the air between ferrets. They seem to overcome the obstacle limiting the global impact of natural H5N1 and many other virulent low-transmission viruses.

In 2012, scientists who performed "gain of function" research have introduced mutations to the H5N1 virus to make it airborne.

Marc Lipsitch and Alison P. Galvani coauthored a paper in PLoS medicine arguing that experiments in which scientists manipulate bird flu viruses to make them transmissible in mammals deserve more intense scrutiny as to whether or not their risks outweigh their benefits. They also described influenza as the most frightening "potential pandemic pathogen".

CRISPR

See also: CRISPR

Following surprisingly fast advances in CRISPR editing, an international summit proclaimed in December 2015 that it was "irresponsible" to proceed with human gene editing until issues in safety and efficacy were addressed. One of the mechanisms that CIRSPR can cause existential risk is through gene drives, which are said to have potential to "revolutionize" ecosystem management. Gene drives are a novel technology that have potential to make genes spread through wild populations like wildfire. They have the potential to quickly spread resistance genes against malaria in order to rebuff the malaria parasite P. falciparum. These gene drives were originally engineered in January 2015 by Ethan Bier and Valentino Gatz – this editing was spurred by the discovery of CRISPR-Cas9. In late 2015, DARPA started to study approaches that could halt gene drives if they went out of control and threatened biological species.

See also

• Global catastrophic risk
• Human extinction
• Biological warfare