Kiel mutiny

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Text supplied by the German Federal Archive: "With the rebellion of the sailors and workers on 3 November 1918 in Kiel the November revolution starts. On 6 November the revolutionary movement reaches Wilhelmshaven. Our picture shows the soldiers' council of the Prinzregent Luitpold."

The Kiel mutiny was a major revolt by sailors of the German High Seas Fleet on 3 November 1918. The revolt triggered the German revolution which was to sweep aside the monarchy within a few days. It ultimately led to the end of the German Empire and to the establishment of the Weimar Republic.


By September 1918, Germany's military situation was close to hopeless. Kaiser Wilhelm II was advised to request the Entente Cordiale for an immediate cease fire and put the government on a democratic footing, hoping for more favorable peace terms.

On 3 October, the Kaiser appointed Prince Maximilian of Baden as the new Imperial Chancellor. In his cabinet the Social Democrats (SPD) also took on responsibility. The most prominent and highest-ranking was Philipp Scheidemann, a prominent leader of the SPD as undersecretary without portfolio.

Morale in the High Seas Fleet

Following the Battle of Jutland, the capital ships of the Imperial Navy had been confined to inactive service in harbor. Many officers and crewmen had volunteered to transfer to the submarines and light vessels which still had a major part to play in the war. The discipline and spirit of those who remained, on lower rations, with the battleships tied up at dock-side inevitably suffered. On 2 August 1917, 350 crewmen of the dreadnought Prinzregent Luitpold staged a protest demonstration in Wilhelmshaven. Two of the ringleaders were executed by firing squad while others were sentenced to prison. During the remaining months of the war secret sailors' councils were formed on a number of the capital ships.[1]

Naval order of 24 October 1918

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The plan to force a naval clash on the high seas.

While the war-weary troops and the population, disappointed by the Kaiser's government, awaited the speedy end of the war, the Imperial Naval Command in Kiel under Admiral Franz von Hipper, without authorization, planned to dispatch the fleet for a last battle against the Royal Navy in the English Channel.[2]

The naval order of 24 October 1918 and the preparations to sail first triggered a mutiny among the affected sailors and then a general revolution which was to sweep aside the monarchy within a few days. The mutinous sailors had no intention of being needlessly sacrificed in the last moment of the war. They were also convinced that the credibility of the new democratic government which was seeking peace would have been compromised by a simultaneous naval attack.

The Wilhelmshaven mutiny

Sailors demonstrating at Wilhelmshaven.

The sailors' revolt started on the Schillig Roads off Wilhelmshaven, where the German fleet had anchored in expectation of a planned battle. During the night from 29 to 30 October 1918 some crews refused to obey orders. Sailors on board three ships from the Third Navy Squadron refused to weigh anchor. Part of the crew on SMS Thüringen and SMS Helgoland, two battleships from the First Navy Squadron, committed outright mutiny and sabotage.

However, when a day later, some torpedo boats pointed their cannons at these ships, the mutineers gave up and were led away without any resistance. Nevertheless, the Naval Command had to drop its plans as it was felt that the crew's loyalty could no longer be relied upon. The Third Navy Squadron was ordered back to Kiel.

The sailors' revolt in Kiel

Sculpture in Kiel to remember the 1918 sailors' mutiny.

The squadron commander Vizeadmiral Hugo Kraft exercised a maneuver with his battleships in the Heligoland Bight. When it "functioned perfectly (tadellos funktionierte)" he believed he was master of his crews again. While moving through the Kiel Canal he had 47 sailors from the Markgraf, who were seen as the ringleaders, imprisoned. In Holtenau (end of the canal in Kiel) they were brought to the Arrestanstalt (the military prison in Kiel) and to Fort Herwarth in the north of Kiel.

The sailors and stokers were now pulling out all the stops to prevent the fleet from setting sail again and to achieve the release of their comrades. Some 250 met in the evening of 1 November in the Union House in Kiel. Delegations, sent to their officers requesting the mutineers' release, were not heard. The sailors were now looking for closer ties to the unions, the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) and the SPD. Thereupon the Union House was closed by police, leading to an even larger joint open-air meeting on 2 November, at the large drill ground (Großer Exerzierplatz).

Led by the sailor Karl Artelt, who worked in the repair ship yard for torpedo boats in Kiel-Wik[3] and by the mobilized shipyard worker Lothar Popp, both USPD members, the sailors called for a large meeting the following day at the same place. This call was heeded by several thousand people on the afternoon of 3 November with workers' representatives also being present. The slogan "Frieden und Brot" (peace and bread) was raised showing that the sailors and workers demanded not only the release of the imprisoned but also the end of the war and the improvement of food provisions. Eventually the people supported Artelt's call to free the prisoners and they moved in the direction of the military prison.

Sublieutenant Steinhäuser, who had orders to stop the demonstrators, ordered his patrol to give warning shots and then to shoot directly into the demonstrators. Seven men were killed and 29 were severely injured. Some demonstrators also opened fire. Steinhäuser was severely injured by rifle-butt blows and shots, but contrary to later statements, he was not killed.[4] After this incident, that is commonly viewed as the starting point of the German Revolution, the demonstrators dispersed and the patrol withdrew.

Protesters take over Kiel

Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found. At the outbreak of the mutiny in Kiel on 3 November 1918 Souchon didn’t turn to be the uprising Lord of the top military commanders at the home area, but directly to the Deputy General Command of adjacent corps area in Altona. So its Commanding General, the General of Infantry Falk, instructed the commander of the Kiel fortress area nearest deputy represented Brigade command, Lieutenant-General v. Wright, to collect all available infantry forces from his replacement battalions under his unified command and leave in the same night with them to Kiel. The General Command sends trains for their transports to Lübeck and Neumunster. Wright alerted the replacement battalions of the 162nd (Lübeck) and the here garrisoned one of the Reserve Regiment from Schleswig and the 163rd in Neumünster. But as the outbreak has been stopped by Souchon the action taken by Wright were reversed before midnight.

While the action revived in the next morning Souchon requested around 10 clock the Chief of General Staff of the deputy corps to help troops from Rendsburg and Lübeck. The Chief of Staff appointed Wright at 11 clock by phone to the commander of all against Kiel put in march replacement battalions.

Wrights plan was to collect all of the oncoming reaction forces south from Kiel and invade in united strength Kiel.[5][6] The plan was based not only on his "experiences during the war", but also on the up to the Brigade staffs distributed General Staff study from 1908 about the "struggle in insurgent towns".

But Souchon rejected the command of a commander's leadership of the land army should take place in the field of naval war port of Kiel for him. Wright's plan and the commander had been unacceptable for him. He called the military commander in Altona and pushed by using his extensive statement of his personal reputation and his special position (Immediatstellung) his opinions through. Even at noon Wright was released by a call from the General Command of his command and asked to put the intervention forces under the direct command of Souchon. Using his last devoted formations in addition with the new ones he wanted to get rid of them.

However, this project was to prove in the bud as unusable. Contrary to the urgent remonstrances of the rejected army leader all occupied with intervention forces special trains were run in the main station. This had been controlled by insurgents. There surprised the revolutionary-minded crowd the oncoming transport.[7]

On the morning of 4 November groups of mutineers moved through the town. Sailors in a large barracks compound in a northern district of Kiel (Wik Garnison: Tirpitz Hafen) refused obedience: after a Division inspection of the commander, spontaneous demonstrations took place. Karl Artelt organized the first soldiers' council, and soon many more were set up. The governor of the navy station had to negotiate. The imprisoned sailors and stokers were freed.

Soldiers and workers brought public and military institutions under their control. When, against Souchon's promise, different troops advanced to quash the rebellion, they were intercepted by the mutineers and were either sent back or joined the sailors and workers. By the evening of 4 November, Kiel was firmly in the hands of approximately 40,000 rebellious sailors, soldiers and workers, as was Wilhelmshaven two days later.

Late in the evening of the 4 November a meeting of sailors and workers representatives in the union house led to the establishment of a soldier's and a worker's council. The Kiel 'Fourteen Points' of the soldier's council were issued:

Plaque at the union house in Kiel saying that the workers' and soldiers' council gathered here during the sailors' mutiny and gave the decisive impulse for the proclamation of the first German republic

Resolutions and demands of the soldiers’ council:

  1. The release of all inmates and political prisoners.
  2. Complete freedom of speech and the press.
  3. The abolition of mail censorship.
  4. Appropriate treatment of crews by superiors.
  5. No punishment for all comrades on returning to the ships and to the barracks.
  6. The launching of the fleet is to be prevented under all circumstances.
  7. Any defensive measures involving bloodshed are to be prevented.
  8. The withdrawal of all troops not belonging to the garrison.
  9. All measures for the protection of private property will be determined by the Soldier’s Council immediately.
  10. Superiors will no longer be recognized outside of duty.
  11. Unlimited personal freedom of every man from the end of his tour of duty until the beginning of his next tour of duty.
  12. Officers who declare themselves in agreement with the measures of the newly established Soldier’s Council, are welcomed in our midst. All the others have to quit their duty without entitlement to provision.
  13. Every member of the Soldier’s Council is to be released from any duty.
  14. All measures to be introduced in the future can only be introduced with the consent of the Soldiers’ Council.

These demands are orders of the Soldier’s Council and are binding for every military person.[8]

Dirk Dähnhardt came to the following conclusion in his 1978 doctoral thesis: "The 14 points of Kiel were ... mainly an attack on the military system, political objectives were lacking widely." [9] Dähnhardt attributes this on the one hand to the heterogeneous composition of the bodies, and on the other hand to the intention to first of all issue a catalogue of immediate measures. During the following events, councils all over Germany oriented themselves on these 14 items. In this political shortsightedness Dähnhardt sees a major reason the soldiers’ councils were dissolved after six months.

Wolfram Wette from the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office noticed: "... the Kiel signal ... did not point in the direction of a council state according to the Bolshevistic example. Instead it stood ... for the demand for the fastest possible ending of the war. Secondly it pointed - starting with the 'Kiel 14 points' - ... in the direction of a liberal, social and democratic political system, in which especially militarism ... should have no space any more." [10]

On the same evening the SPD deputy Gustav Noske arrived in Kiel and was welcomed enthusiastically although he had orders from the new government and the SPD leadership to bring the rising under control. He had himself elected chairman of the soldiers' council and reinstated peace and order. Some days later he took over the governor's post, while Lothar Popp from the USPD became chairman of the overall soldiers council. During the coming weeks Noske actually managed to reduce the influence of the councils in Kiel, but he could not prevent the spreading of the revolution to all of Germany. The events had already spread far beyond the city limits.

Regarding Noske’s role in Kiel Wette noticed: "What he [Noske] however did not bring about, and possibly because of his political basic position was not able and did not want to bring about, was the exemplary test of a future oriented republic reform programme. Such an experiment would have been quite possible in Kiel - at any rate, in the military-political area. Attempts regarding persons and structures were there. Noske didn't foster and didn't utilize them, but suffocated them before they could develop." [11]

Aftermath: German Revolution of 1918–19

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Other seamen, soldiers and workers, in solidarity with the arrested, began electing worker and soldier councils modeled after the soviets of the Russian Revolution of 1917, and took over military and civil powers in many cities. On 7 November, the revolution had reached Munich, causing Ludwig III of Bavaria to flee.

See also

Naval mutinies:


  • Dirk Dähnhardt: Revolution in Kiel. Der Ubergang vom Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik. Karl Wachholtz Verlag, Neumünster, 1978, ISBN 3-529-02636-0
  • Wolfram Wette: Gustav Noske – eine politische Biographie. Droste Verlag, 1987, ISBN 3-7700-0728-X
  • Wolfram Wette: Gustav Noske und die Revolution in Kiel 1918. Boyens Buchverlag, Heide 2010, ISBN 978-3-8042-1322-7; published as special edition from the Gesellschaft für Kieler Stadtgeschichte, by Jürgen Jensen, Band 64

External links

  • Homepage from Kiel Interview with Lothar Popp; interviews with further contemporary witnesses; evaluations; detailed time-line with documents etc.


  1. Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
  2. This chapter and the whole article follow the doctoral thesis written by Dirk Dähnhardt, and published 1978 as Revolution in Kiel.; details see under Literature.
  3. According to Dirk Dähnhardt, Revolution in Kiel (p. 56) Artelt worked in the Torpedowerkstatt Friedrichsort. It seems Dähnhardt made a mistake here: those sources which he refers to and in a report from the Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archive, Erinnerungsbericht Karl Artelts, Sign.: SGY 30/0022) show definitely that Artelt worked in the Torpedobootsreparatur-werkstatt or -werft (ship workshop or yard for the repair of torpedo boats) in Kiel Wik. Robert Rosentreter, Blaujacken im Novembersturm (p. 32) seems to have just copied Dähnhardt's information, although he claims to refer to Artelt's statements from 1960.
  4. Hauptkrankenbuch Festungslazarett Kiel, Nr. 15918, Krankenbuchlager Berlin, zit. bei Dirk, Dähnhardt, Revolution in Kiel. p. 66.
  5. Czech-Jochberg: Die Politiker der Republik. K. F. Koehler, Leipzig 1933 , S. 20.
  6. Revolution in Kiel. In: Bundeszeitung der Vereinigung ehemaliger 163er. 13. Jahrgang, Nr. 11, Ausgabe vom 1. November 1936, S. 3
  7. Ernst-Heinrich Schmidt: Heimatheer und Revolution 1918. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1981, ISBN 3-421-06060-6.
  8. K. Kuhl: Die 14 Kieler Punkte (The Kiel 14 points)
  9. D. Dähnhardt: Revolution in Kiel. Karl Wachholtz Verlag, Neumünster 1978, p. 91.
  10. Wolfram Wette: "Die Novemberrevolution - Kiel 1918", in Fleischhauer und Turowski: "Kieler Erinnerungsorte", Boyens, 2006.
  11. Wolfram Wette: Als bei der Torpedo-Division der erste Soldatenrat gebildet wurde. In: Frankfurter Rundschau, 12 December 1988