China–United States relations

From Infogalactic: the planetary knowledge core
(Redirected from U.S.–China relations)
Jump to: navigation, search
China-United States relations
Map indicating locations of China and USA


United States
Diplomatic Mission
Chinese Embassy, Washington, D.C. United States Embassy, Beijing
Ambassador Cui Tiankai Ambassador Max Sieben Baucus
Embassy of the United States in China
Embassy of China in the United States

China–United States relations, more often known as US-Chinese relations, Chinese-US relations or Sino-American relations, refer to international relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. The partnership between China and the United States, where each nation regards each other as a potential adversary as well as a strategic partner, has been described by world leaders and academicians as the world's most important bilateral relationship of the century.[1][2]

As of 2014, the United States has the world's largest economy and China the second largest. The International Monetary Fund estimates that China's economy has overtaken that of United States in terms of GDP (PPP) in 2014 but the United States' economy will remain larger than China's in nominal GDP.[3]

China–United States relations have generally been stable with some periods of open conflict, most notably during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Currently, China and the United States have mutual political, economic, and security interests, including, but not limited to, the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, although there are unresolved concerns relating to the role of democracy in government in China and human rights in both respective countries. China remains the largest foreign creditor of the United States,[4] holding about 10% ($1.8 trillion) of the U.S. national debt.

The two countries remain in dispute over territorial issues in the South China Sea. At the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2014, both countries confirmed that they wanted to improve their relationship. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the United States did not seek to contain China,[5] while Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that a confrontation between the two countries would be a disaster.[citation needed]

Public opinion between both countries tends to fluctuate around 40 to 50 percent. As of 2015, China's public opinion of the U.S. is at 44%, while the United State's public opinion of China is significantly lower at 38%.[6] The highest recorded favorable opinion of the United States was at 58% (2010) and the lowest at 38% (2007).[7] While the highest recorded favorable opinion of China was at 52% (2006) and the lowest at 35% (2014)

Country comparison

China People's Republic of China United States United States of America
Population 1,368,260,000 (February 2015 est.)[8] 320,415,000
Population growth 0.44% (2014 est.)[8] 0.77% (2014 est.)[9]
Urbanization 50.6% of total population (2011)[8] 82.4% of total population (2011)[9]
Area[10] 9,596,961 km2 9,857,306 km2
Population density 144/km² 34.2/km²
Capital Beijing Washington, D.C.
Largest city Shanghai – 24,150,000 (21,766,000 Metro) New York City – 8,405,837 (19,949,502 Metro)
Government Socialist one-party state Federal presidential constitutional republic
First leader Mao Zedong George Washington
Current leader(s) President: Xi Jinping
Premier: Li Keqiang
President: Barack Obama
Main languages Chinese English
Main religions Officially an atheist state
52.2% Unaffiliated[8]
21.9% folk religion[8]
18.2% Buddhism[8]
5.1% Christians[8]
1.8% Islam[8]
< 0.1% Hindu[11]
< 0.1% Jews[8]
0.7% Other (includes Taoist[8])
51.1% Protestanism[9]
24.0% Roman Catholic[9]
16.1% unaffiliated or none[9]
1.7% Jews[9]
1.7% Mormons[9]
1.6% other Christian[9]
0.7% Buddhism[9]
0.6% Islam[9]
2.5% other or unspecified[9]
Ethnic groups 91.6% Han Chinese[8]
55 recognized minorities,[8]
62.6% White[12] (non-Hispanic) (July 2013)
17.1% Hispanic[12] (July 2013)
13.2% Black[12] (July 2013)
5.3% Asian[12] (July 2013)
2.4% Two or more races
0.77% American Indian or Alaska Native
0.2% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
GDP (nominal) $10.357 trillion $17.348 trillion
GDP (nominal) per capita $7,572 $54,370
GDP (PPP) $18.088 trillion $17.348 trillion
GDP (PPP) per capita $13,224 $54,370
Real GDP growth rate 7.3% 2.4%
Gini 47.4 36.9
HDI 0.719 0.914
Currency Renminbi (yuan) (¥) United States dollar ($)
Expatriates 110,000 Americans 3,794,673 Chinese
Military expenditure $188.0 billion $640.0 billion
Military personnel 6,927,000 2,226,635
English speakers 10,000,000[citation needed] 294,469,560
Labor force 787,600,000 156,080,000
Mobile phones 1,046,510,000 327,577,529

Leaders of the United States and the People's Republic of China (1949-present).

The Qing Dynasty and the United States

Formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Chinese Empire began about June 16, 1844 as the countries engaged in the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Wangxia. From 1784 consuls were sent to Guangzhou, the treaty port open to traders from the United States.[13]

According to a Chinese diplomat who negotiated with the United States in 1844:

Old China Trade

An example of a Chinese-made lap desk from the early 1800s. Lap desks such as these were especially popular among American merchants, who used them to write letters or conduct business during their lengthy voyages at sea.

Coins, ginseng, and furs, and more prominently tea, cotton, silk, lacquerware, porcelain, and furniture were once traded as commodities between the two countries.

Opium Wars

After the Treaty of Nanking at the end of the First Opium War in 1842, many Chinese ports were forced to open to foreign trade, which threatened American trade in the region.[15] President John Tyler, however, secured the 1844 Treaty of Wanghia, which gave Americans the right of extraterritoriality, and placed American trade on par with British trade. This treaty effectively ended the era of the Old China Trade, giving to the rise of the United States as an emergent power.

After China's defeat in the Second Opium War, the then emperor of China, Xianfeng, fled Beijing. His brother Yixin, the Prince Gong, ratified the Treaty of Tientsin in the Convention of Peking on October 18, 1860. This treaty stipulated, among other terms, that along with Britain, France, and Russia, the United States would have the right to station administrative offices in Beijing, which was closed prior to the war.


In 1867, during the Rover incident, Taiwanese aborigines attacked shipwrecked American sailors, killing the entire crew. They subsequently skirmished against and defeated a retaliatory expedition by the American military and killed another American during the battle.

The Burlingame Treaty and the Chinese Exclusion Act

The first page of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882

In 1868, the Qing government appointed Anson Burlingame as their emissary to the United States. Burlingame toured the country to build support for equitable treatment for China and for Chinese emigrants. The 1868 Burlingame Treaty embodied these principles. In 1871, the Chinese Educational Mission brought the first of two groups of 120 Chinese boys to study in the United States. They were led by Yung Wing, the first Chinese man to graduate from an American university.

During the California Gold Rush and the construction of the transcontinental railroad, large numbers of Chinese emigrated to the US, spurring animosity from American citizens. After being forcibly driven from the mines, most Chinese settled in Chinatowns in cities such as San Francisco, taking up low-end wage labor, such as restaurant and cleaning work. With the post-Civil War economy in decline by the 1870s, anti-Chinese animosity became politicized by labor leader Denis Kearney and his party, as well as by the California governor John Bigler. Both blamed Chinese coolies for depressed wage levels.

In the first significant restriction on free immigration in US history, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act on May 6, 1882, following revisions made in 1880 to the Burlingame Treaty. Those revisions allowed the United States to suspend immigration, and Congress acted quickly to implement the suspension of Chinese immigration and exclude Chinese skilled and unskilled laborers from entering the country for ten years, under penalty of imprisonment and deportation. The ban was renewed a number of times, lasting for over 60 years.

Searching for the China market

The American China Development Company, founded in 1895 by J.P. Morgan and Andrew Carnegie, sought to provide the American capital and management that would generate a rapid industrialization of China. It started building the Hankow-Canton Railroad, to link central and southern China. It only managed to finish 30 miles of line. Americans soon grew disillusioned, and sold out to a rival Belgian syndicate.[16] On the whole, the American dream of getting rich by investing in China or selling to hundreds of millions of Chinese was almost always a failure.[citation needed] Standard Oil did succeed in selling kerosene to the China market, but few others made a profit.[17]

The Boxer Rebellion

US troops in China during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.

In 1899, a movement of Chinese nationalists calling themselves the Society of Right and Harmonious Fists started a violent revolt in China, referred to by Westerners as the Boxer Rebellion, against foreign influence in trade, politics, religion, and technology. The campaigns took place from November 1899 to September 7, 1901, during the final years of Manchu rule in China under the Qing dynasty.[18]

The uprising began as an anti-foreign, anti-imperialist, peasant-based movement in northern China, in response to foreign westerners seizing land from locals, concession grabbing, and granting immunity to criminals who converted to Catholicism. The insurgents attacked foreigners, who were building railroads and violating Feng shui, and Christians, who were held responsible for the foreign domination of China. In June 1900, the Boxers entered Peking, killing 230 foreign diplomats and foreigners as well as thousands of Chinese Christians, mostly in the provinces of Shandong and Shanxi. On June 21, in response to the Western attack on the Chinese Dagu Forts Empress Dowager Cixi declared war against all Western powers. Diplomats, foreign civilians, soldiers, and Chinese Christians were besieged during the Siege of the International Legations for 55 days. A coalition called the Eight-Nation Alliance comprising Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Britain and the United States rushed 20,000 troops to their rescue. The multinational forces were initially defeated by a Chinese Muslim army at the Battle of Langfang, but the second attempt in the Gaselee Expedition was successful due to internal rivalries among the Chinese forces.

The Chinese government was forced to indemnify the victims and make many additional concessions. Subsequent reforms implemented after the rebellion contributed to the end of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the modern Chinese Republic. The United States played a secondary but significant role in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion, largely due to the presence of US ships and troops deployed in the Philippines since the American conquest of the Spanish–American and Philippine–American War. Within the United States Armed Forces, the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion was known as the China Relief Expedition.

The Chinese paid indemnities to each of the powers. The U.S. used its $11 million share to promote cultural and educational exchanges and help China modernize. A number of schools were established in China, such as Tsinghua College in Peking.[19][20]

Open Door Policy

The former residence of Envoy Wu Tingfang and the Office of the Qing Legation to the United States, located in the Dupont Circle neighborhood of Washington, D.C.

In the late 19th century, the major world powers (France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Russia) began carving out spheres of influence for themselves in China, which was then under the Qing dynasty. The United States, not having such influence, wanted this practice to end. In 1899, US Secretary of State John Hay sent diplomatic letters to these nations, asking them to guarantee the territorial and administrative integrity of China and to not interfere with the free use of treaty ports within their respective spheres of influence.[21] The major powers evaded commitment, saying they could not agree to anything until the other powers had consented first. Hay took this as acceptance of his proposal, which came to be known as the Open Door Policy.[22]

While respected internationally, the Open Door Policy was ignored by Russian and Japan when they encroached in Manchuria. The US protested Russia's actions. Japan and Russia fought the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, in which the U.S. mediated a peace. Japan also presented a further challenge to the policy with its Twenty-One Demands in 1915 made on the then-Republic of China. Japan also made secret treaties with the Allies promising Japan the German territories in China. In 1931, Japan invaded and occupied Manchuria. The United States along with other countries condemned the action, leading to U.S. support for China in its war with Japan after 1937.[23]

The Republic of China and the United States

First few decades

After the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, the United States government recognized the Republic of China (ROC) government as the sole and legitimate government of China despite a number of governments ruling various parts of China. China was reunified by a single government, ROC, led by the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1928. The first winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature for writing about China was an American, born in the United States but raised in China, Pearl S. Buck, whose 1938 Nobel lecture was titled The Chinese Novel.[24]

World War II

The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 saw aid flow into the Republic of China, from the United States under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. A series of Neutrality Acts had been passed in the US with the support of isolationists who forbade American aid to countries at war. Because the Second Sino-Japanese War was undeclared, however, Roosevelt denied that a state of war existed in China and proceeded to send aid to Chiang.

American public sympathy for the Chinese was aroused by reports from missionaries, novelists such as Pearl S. Buck, and Time Magazine of Japanese brutality in China, including reports surrounding the Nanking Massacre, also known as the 'Rape of Nanking'. Japanese-American relations were further soured by the USS Panay incident during the bombing of Nanjing, in which a gunboat of the U.S. Navy was accidentally sunk by Japanese aircraft (whether or not it was in fact unintentional is disputed). Roosevelt demanded an apology and compensation from the Japanese, which was received, but relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate. Edgar Snow's 1937 book Red Star Over China reported that Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party was effective in carrying out reforms and guerrilla fighting the Japanese. When open war broke out in the summer of 1937, the United States offered moral support but took no effective action.[citation needed]

United States formally declared war on Japan in December 1941 following the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought the Americans into World War II. The Roosevelt administration gave massive amounts of aid to Chiang's beleaguered government, now headquartered in Chungking. Madame Chiang Kai-shek,[25] who had been educated in the United States, addressed the US Congress and toured the country to rally support for China. Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act and Roosevelt moved to end the unequal treaties by establishing the Treaty for Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China. However, the perception that Chiang's government was unable to effectively resist the Japanese or that he preferred to focus more on defeating the Communists grew. China Hands such as Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell—who spoke fluent Mandarin Chinese—argued that it was in American interest to establish communication with the Communists to prepare for a land-based counteroffensive invasion of Japan. The Dixie Mission, which began in 1943, was the first official American contact with the Communists. Other Americans, such as Claire Lee Chennault, argued for air power. In 1944, Generalissimo Chiang demanded that Stilwell be recalled. General Albert Coady Wedemeyer replaced Stilwell, and Patrick J. Hurley became ambassador.

The American OSS (predecessor of the CIA) showed an interest in a plot to seize control of Chiang's regime. Chiang ordered the rebels involved executed.[26] Chiang felt no friendliness towards the United States, and viewed it as pursuing imperialist motives in China. Chiang did not want to be subordinate to either the United States or the Soviet Union, but jockeyed for room between the two and wanted to get the most out of the Soviets and the Americans without taking sides.[27] Abusive incidents had occurred with a drunk American general making comments about Chiang's regime, and the rape of two Chinese school girls by American Marines.[27]

Chiang did not like the Americans, and was suspicious of their motives.[28] Chiang also differed from the Americans in ideology issues. He organized the Kuomintang as a Leninist-style party, oppressed dissent, and banned democracy,[29] claiming it was impossible for China.[30]

Chiang manipulated the Soviets and Americans during the war, at first telling the Americans that they would be welcome in talks between the Soviet Union and China, then secretly telling the Soviets that the Americans were unimportant and their opinions were to be left out. At the same time, Chiang positioned American support and military power in China against the Soviet Union as a factor in the talks, keeping the Soviets from taking advantage of China with the threat of American military action against the Soviets.[31]

Chiang's right-hand man, the secret police chief Dai Li, was both anti-American, and anti-Communist.[32] Dai ordered Kuomintang agents to spy on American officers.[33] Dai had previously been involved with the Blue Shirts Society, a Fascist-inspired paramilitary group in the Kuomintang that wanted to expel Western and Japanese imperialists, crush the Communists, and eliminate feudalism.[34] Dai Li was assassinated in a plane crash orchestrated by the American OSS or the Communists.[35]

Civil War in Mainland China

After World War II ended in 1945, the hostility between the Republic of China and the Communist Party of China exploded into open civil war. The KMT lost effective control of mainland China in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. In the China White Paper in August 1949 drafted by the US State Department that the United States was announcing the hands-off policy to the ROC in Taiwan to the upcoming military attacks from the People's Liberation Army. General Douglas MacArthur directed the military forces under Chiang Kai-shek to go to the island of Taiwan to accept the surrender of Japanese troops, thus beginning the military occupation of Taiwan. American general George Marshall tried to broker a truce between the Republic of China and the Communist Party of China in 1946, but it quickly lost momentum. The Nationalist cause declined until 1949, when the Communists emerged victorious and drove the Nationalists from the Chinese mainland onto Taiwan and other islands. Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China in mainland China,[36] while Taiwan and other islands are still retained under the Republic of China rule to this day.

Cold War relations

After the Korean War broke out, the Truman administration resumed economic and military aid to the ROC and neutralized Taiwan Strait by United States Seventh Fleet to stop a Communist invasion of Formosa. Until the US formally recognized China in 1979, Washington provided ROC with financial grants based on the Foreign Assistance Act,[37] Mutual Security Act and Act for International Development enacted by the US Congress. A separate Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty was signed between the two governments of US and ROC in 1954 and lasted until 1979.

With President Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower waved hands to crowds during his visit to Taipei, Taiwan in June 1960.

The U.S. State Department's official position in 1959 was:

That the provisional capital of the Republic of China has been at Taipei, Taiwan (Formosa) since December 1949; that the Government of the Republic of China exercises authority over the island; that the sovereignty of Formosa has not been transferred to China; and that Formosa is not a part of China as a country, at least not as yet, and not until and unless appropriate treaties are hereafter entered into. Formosa may be said to be a territory or an area occupied and administered by the Government of the Republic of China, but is not officially recognized as being a part of the Republic of China."[38]

Termination of diplomatic relations

On January 1, 1979, the United States changed its diplomatic recognition of Chinese government from Taipei to Beijing. In the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué that announced the change, the United States recognized the People's Republic of China as the government of China. The Joint Communiqué also stated that within this context the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people on Taiwan. Since then, the ROC has often been referred to as 'Taiwan' to avoid confusion, although the PRC government claims Taiwan as a province of China.

Shortly before the termination of diplomatic relations, on December 28 and 29, 1978, before Carter’s telegram message to the PRC, a US representative was sent to the ROC for negotiations with ROC President Chiang Ching-Kuo. The content of these meetings mainly circled around the diplomatic state between the US and Taiwan after the American diplomatic reestablishment with China. Upon arrival to Taipei, there was a great disturbance with the presence of the Americans. Understandably so, the Taiwanese people were angered by the “betrayal” of the US Government. There were several protests and the Americans, only with heavy security precautions, were able to navigate the city safely to and from meetings. The United States’ representative, following the President’s orders, attempted to negotiate four principal objectives that would, hopefully, provide a sort of compromise between the two nations. The first of these objectives was that “all treaties and agreements in force between the two countries will remain in effect after January 1, 1979, with each side retaining such rights or abrogation or termination as are provided in the treaties and agreements themselves or inherently in international law and practice.” The second objective of the negotiations was to continue operation of embassies and staff from January 1, 1979 until February 28, 1979. The third objective discussed was that the ROC and the US “will establish and put into operation … a new instrumentality … which would neither have the character of, nor be considered as, official governmental organizations.” The fourth and final objective was simply that the two nations would meet again to establish a more detailed plan regarding the future of the two nations.[39]

The People's Republic of China and the United States

Origins of the People's Republic of China

The United States did not formally recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) for 30 years after its founding. Instead, the US maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China government on Taiwan, recognizing it as the sole legitimate government of China.

However, the Taiwan-based Republic of China government did not trust the United States. An enemy of the Chiang family, K. C. Wu, was removed from his position as governor of Taiwan by Chiang Ching-kuo and fled to America in 1953. Chiang Kai-shek, president of the Republic of China, suspected that the American CIA was engineering a coup with Sun Li-jen, an American-educated Chinese man who attended the Virginia Military Institute, with the goal of making Taiwan an independent state. Chiang placed Sun under house arrest in 1955.[40][41]

Chiang Ching-kuo, educated in the Soviet Union, initiated Soviet-style military organization in the Republic of China military, reorganizing and Sovietizing the political officer corps and surveillance. Kuomintang party activities were propagated throughout the military. Sun Li-jen opposed this action.[42]

As the People's Liberation Army moved south to complete the conquest of mainland China in 1949, the American embassy followed Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China government to Taipei, while US consular officials remained in mainland China. However, the People's Republic of China was hostile to the American presence, and all US personnel were withdrawn from the mainland in early 1950.[citation needed] In December 1950, the People's Republic seized all American assets and properties, totaling $196.8 million, after the US had frozen Chinese assets in America following the PRC's entry into the Korean War in November.[43]

Korean War

A column of troops and armor of the 1st Marine Division move through communist Chinese lines during their successful breakout from the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea.

The Korean War began when US and Chinese forces engaged in open conflict on November 1, 1950. In response to the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea, the United Nations Security Council was convened and passed UNSC Resolution 82, declaring war on North Korea unanimously. The resolution was adopted mainly because the Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, had been boycotting UN proceedings since January, in protest that the Republic of China and not the People's Republic of China held a permanent seat on the council.[44]

The American-led allied forces pushed the invading Korean People's Army back into North Korea, past the North-South border at the 38th parallel and began to approach the Yalu River on the China-North Korea border. As a result, China undertook a massive intervention into the conflict in support of North Korea. The Chinese army struck in the west along the Chongchon River and completely overran several South Korean divisions, successfully landing a heavy blow to the flank of the remaining forces. The defeat of the US Eighth Army resulted in the longest retreat of any American military unit in history.[45] Both sides sustained heavy casualties before the allied forces were able to push Chinese forces back, near the original division. In late March 1951, after the Chinese army had moved large numbers of new forces near the Korean border, US bomb loading pits at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa were made operational. On April 5, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff released orders for immediate retaliatory attacks using nuclear weapons against Manchurian bases to prevent new Chinese troops from entering the battles or bombing attacks originating from those bases. On the same day, Truman gave his approval for transfer of nine Mark IV nuclear capsules "to the Air Force's Ninth Bomb Group, the designated carrier of the weapons," signing an order to use them against Chinese and Korean targets.[not specific enough to verify] Two years of continued fighting ended in a stalemate, until the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. Since then, a divided Korea has become an important factor in Sino-American relations. Also, the entry of China in the Korean War caused a major change in US policy from minimal support of the Nationalist government in Taiwan to Taiwan as protected by the United States.

Vietnam War

China's involvement in the Vietnam War began in 1949, when China was reunified under Communist rule. The People's Republic of China provided resources and training to Communists in Vietnam, and in the summer of 1962, Mao Zedong agreed to supply Hanoi with 90,000 rifles and guns free of charge. After the launch of the America's Operation "Rolling Thunder", China sent anti-aircraft units and engineering battalions to North Vietnam to repair the damage caused by American bombing, rebuild roads and railroads, and perform other engineering work, freeing the North Vietnamese army units for combat in the South. The United States lost 58,159 troops in the Vietnam War.

Relations frozen

The United States continued to work to prevent the PRC from taking China's seat in the United Nations and encouraged its allies not to deal with the PRC. The United States placed an embargo on trading with the PRC, and encouraged allies to follow it. The PRC developed nuclear weapons in 1964 and, as later declassified documents revealed, President Lyndon B. Johnson considered preemptive attacks to halt its nuclear program. He ultimately decided the measure carried too much risk and it was abandoned.

Despite this official non-recognition, the United States and the People's Republic of China held 136 meetings at the ambassadorial level beginning in 1954 and continuing until 1970, first in Geneva and in 1958–1970 at Myślewicki Palace in Warsaw.[46]

Beginning in 1967, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission established the China Claims Program, in which American citizens could denominate the sum total of their lost assets and property following the Communist seizure of foreign property in 1950. In the program's scope were “(1) losses resulting from the nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other taking of, or special measures directed against, property or nationals of the United States; and (2) disability or death, resulting from actions taken by or under the authority of the Chinese Communist regime.” Any American citizen who had lost property in China following the declaration of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, was entitled to file a claim with the Commission.[47] Claimants included the Chinese Medical Board of New York, which operated the Peking Union Medical College, Esso Standard (the predecessor of Exxon Mobil), which owned the Shanghai Power Company, and American Express, which fled China in September 1949 amid Civil War and hyperinflation. In retaliation for unsettled accounts with Chinese citizens, the PRC refused to grant an exit visa to an American Express employee, who remained in China for five years.[48] Because of the expropriation of assets, American companies would remain hesitant to reinvest in China despite (future Chairman) Deng Xiaoping's reassurances of a stable business environment.[49]


The end of the 1960s brought a period of transformation. For China, when American president Johnson decided to wind down the Vietnam war in 1968, it gave China an impression that the US had no interest of expanding in Asia anymore while the USSR became a more serious threat as it intervened in Czechoslovakia to displace a communist government and might well interfere in China.[50]

This became an especially important concern for the People's Republic of China after the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969. The PRC was diplomatically isolated and the leadership came to believe that improved relations with the United States would be a useful counterbalance to the Soviet threat. Zhou Enlai, the PRC premier foreign minister, was at the forefront of this effort with the committed backing of Mao Zedong. In 1969, the United States initiated measures to relax trade restrictions and other impediments to bilateral contact, to which China responded. However, this rapprochement process was stalled by the Vietnam war where China was supporting the enemies of the U.S. Communication between Chinese and American leaders, however, was conducted with Pakistan and Poland as intermediaries.

Henry Kissinger, shown here with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, made two secret trips to the PRC in 1971 before Nixon's groundbreaking visit in 1972.

In the United States, academics such as John K. Fairbank and A. Doak Barnett pointed to the need to deal realistically with the Beijing government, while organizations such as the National Committee on United States–China Relations sponsored debates to promote public awareness. Many saw the specter of Communist China behind Communist movements in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, but a growing number concluded that if the PRC would align with the US it would mean a major redistribution of global power against the Soviets. Mainland China's market of nearly one billion consumers appealed to American business. Senator J. William Fulbright, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, held a series of hearings on the matter.[51]

Richard. M. Nixon mentioned in his inaugural address that the two countries were entering an era of negotiation after an era of confrontation. Nixon had a reputation as strongly anti-Communist, but he had a vision of moving beyond containment to détente and friendly relations.[52] Nixon believed it was in the American national interest to forge a relationship with China, even though there were enormous differences between the two countries.[53] He was assisted in this by his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. Domestic politics also entered into Nixon's thinking, as the boost from a successful courting of the PRC could help him in the 1972 American presidential election. He also worried that one of the Democrats would preempt him and go to the PRC before he had the opportunity.

Richard Nixon met with Mao Zedong in 1972.

In 1971, an unexpectedly friendly encounter between the American and Chinese ping-pong athletes in Japan opened the way for a visit to China, which Chairman Mao personally approved.[54] In April, 1971 the athletes became the first Americans to officially visit China since the communist takeover. The smooth acceptance of this so-called "ping-pong diplomacy" gave confidence to both sides. In July 1971, Henry Kissinger feigned illness while on a trip to Pakistan and did not appear in public for a day. He was actually on a top-secret mission to Beijing to negotiate with Zhou Enlai. On July 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon revealed the mission to the world and that he had accepted an invitation to visit the PRC.[55]

This announcement[56] caused immediate shock around the world. In the United States, some hard-line anti-communists denounced the decision, but public opinion supported the move and Nixon saw the jump in the polls he had been hoping for. Since Nixon had sterling anti-communist credentials he was all but immune to being called "soft on communism." Nixon and his aides wanted to ensure that press coverage offered dramatic imagery.[57] Nixon was particularly eager for strong news coverage.

President Nixon and First Lady Pat Nixon walk with the American delegation and their Chinese hosts on the Great Wall of China.

Within the PRC there was also opposition from left-wing elements. This effort was allegedly led by Lin Biao, head of the military, who died in a mysterious plane crash over Mongolia while trying to defect to the Soviet Union. His death silenced most internal dissent over the visit.

Internationally, reactions varied. The Soviets were very concerned that two major enemies seemed to have resolved their differences, and the new world alignment contributed significantly to the policy of détente.

America's European allies and Canada were pleased by the initiative, especially since many of them had already recognized the PRC. In Asia, the reaction was far more mixed. Japan was annoyed that it had not been told of the announcement until fifteen minutes before it had been made, and feared that the Americans were abandoning them in favor of the PRC. A short time later, Japan also recognized the PRC and committed to substantial trade with the continental power. South Korea and South Vietnam were both concerned that peace between the United States and the PRC could mean an end to American support for them against their Communist enemies. Throughout the period of rapprochement, both countries had to be regularly assured that they would not be abandoned.

From February 21 to February 28, 1972, President Nixon traveled to Beijing, Hangzhou, and Shanghai. At the conclusion of his trip, the US and the PRC issued the Shanghai Communiqué, a statement of their respective foreign policy views. In the Communiqué, both nations pledged to work toward the full normalization of diplomatic relations. This did not lead to immediate recognition of the People's Republic of China but 'liaison offices' were established in Beijing and Washington.[58] The US acknowledged the PRC position that all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The statement enabled the US and PRC to temporarily set aside the issue of Taiwan and open trade and communication. Also, the USA and China both agreed to take action against 'any country' that is to establish 'hegemony' in the Asia-Pacific.[58]

The rapprochement with the United States benefited the PRC immensely and greatly increased its security for the rest of the Cold War. It has been argued that the United States, on the other hand, saw fewer benefits than it had hoped for. The PRC continued to heavily support North Vietnam in the Vietnam War and also backed the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. Eventually, however, the PRC's suspicion of Vietnam's motives led to a break in Sino-Vietnamese cooperation and, upon the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, the Sino-Vietnamese War. Both China and the United States backed combatants in Africa against Soviet and Cuban-supported movements. The economic benefits of normalization were slow as it would take decades for American products to penetrate the vast Chinese market. While Nixon's China policy is regarded by many as the highlight of his presidency, others such as William Bundy have argued that it provided very little benefit to the United States.[citation needed]

Liaison Office, 1973–1978

President Gerald Ford makes remarks at a Reciprocal Dinner in Beijing on December 4, 1975.

In May 1973, in an effort to build toward formal diplomatic relations, the US and the PRC established the United States Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing and a counterpart PRC office in Washington. In 1973 to 1978, such distinguished Americans as David K. E. Bruce, George H. W. Bush, Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and Leonard Woodcock served as chiefs of the USLO with the personal rank of ambassador. China made clear that it considered the Soviet Union its chief adversary, and urged the United States to be powerful, thereby distracting Moscow. Liaison officer George Bush concluded, "China keeps wanting us to be strong, wanting us to defend Europe, wanting us to increase our defense budgets, etc."[59] Bush concluded that American engagement was essential to support markets, allies, and stability in Asia and around the world.[60]

President Gerald Ford visited the PRC in 1975 and reaffirmed American interest in normalizing relations with Beijing. Shortly after taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter again reaffirmed the goals of the Shanghai Communiqué. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, and senior staff member of the National Security Council Michel Oksenberg encouraged Carter to seek full diplomatic and trade relations with China. Although Brzezinksi sought to quickly establish a security relationship with Beijing to counter the Soviet Union, Carter sided with Vance in believing that such a deal would threaten existing U.S.-Soviet relations, including the SALT II negotiations. Thus, the administration decided to cautiously pursue political normalization and not military relations.[61] Vance, Brzezinski, and Oksenberg traveled to Beijing in early 1978 to work with Leonard Woodcock, then head of the liaison office, to lay the groundwork to do so. The United States and the People's Republic of China announced on December 15, 1978 that the two governments would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.


In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, dated January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The US reiterated the Shanghai Communiqué's acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; Beijing acknowledged that the American people would continue to carry on commercial, cultural, and other unofficial contacts with the people of Taiwan.[62]

Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping's January 1979 visit to Washington initiated a series of important, high-level exchanges which continued until the spring of 1989. This resulted in many bilateral agreements, especially in the fields of scientific, technological, and cultural interchange, as well as trade relations. Since early 1979, the United States and the PRC have initiated hundreds of joint research projects and cooperative programs under the Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology, the largest bilateral program.[63]

On March 1, 1979, the two countries formally established embassies in each other's capitals. In 1979, outstanding private claims were resolved and a bilateral trade agreement was completed. Vice President Walter Mondale reciprocated Vice Premier Deng's visit with an August 1979 trip to China. This visit led to agreements in September 1980 on maritime affairs, civil aviation links, and textile matters, as well as a bilateral consular convention.

Deng Xiaoping with US President Jimmy Carter

As a consequence of high-level and working-level contacts initiated in 1980, New York City and Beijing become sister cities, US dialogue with the PRC broadened to cover a wide range of issues, including global and regional strategic problems, political-military questions, including arms control, UN, and other multilateral organization affairs, and international narcotics matters.[64]

High-level exchanges continued to be a significant means for developing US-PRC relations in the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang made reciprocal visits in 1984. In July 1985, President Li Xiannian traveled to the United States, the first such visit by a PRC head of state. Vice President Bush visited the PRC in October 1985 and opened the US Consulate General in Chengdu, the US's fourth consular post in the PRC. Further exchanges of cabinet-level officials occurred between 1985 and 1989, capped by President Bush's visit to Beijing in February 1989.

In the period before the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, a growing number of cultural exchange activities gave the American and Chinese peoples broad exposure to each other's cultural, artistic, and educational achievements. Numerous mainland Chinese professional and official delegations visited the United States each month. Many of these exchanges continued after the suppression of the Tiananmen protests.[65]

Taiwan issue

The expanding relationship that followed normalization was threatened in 1981 by PRC objections to the level of US arms sales to the Republic of China on Taiwan. Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited China in June 1981 in an effort to resolve Chinese concerns about America's unofficial relations with Taiwan. Vice President Bush visited the PRC in May 1982. Eight months of negotiations produced the US-PRC Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982. In this third communiqué, the US stated its intention to gradually reduce the level of arms sales to the Republic of China, and the PRC described as a fundamental policy their effort to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question. The Taiwan Relations Act [66] made the necessary changes in US domestic law to permit such unofficial relations with Taiwan to flourish. After the announcement of the intention to establish diplomatic relations with China on 15 December 1978, the Republic of China immediately condemned the United States, leading to rampant protests in both Taiwan and in the US.[67]

Tiananmen protests to 9/11 attacks

Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin holding a joint press conference at the White House, October 29, 1997.

Following China's violent suppression of demonstrators in June 1989, the US and other governments enacted a number of measures against of China's violation of human rights. The US suspended high-level official exchanges with the PRC and weapons exports from the US to the PRC. The US also imposed a number of economic sanctions. In the summer of 1990, at the G7 Houston summit, the West called for renewed political and economic reforms in mainland China, particularly in the field of human rights.[68]

Tiananmen event disrupted the US-China trade relationship, and US investors' interest in mainland China dropped dramatically. Tourist traffic fell off sharply.[69] The Bush administration Denounce the repression and suspended certain trade and investment programs on June 5 and 20, 1989.[70] Some sanctions were legislated while others were executive actions. Examples include:

  • The US Trade and Development Agency (TDA): new activities in mainland China were suspended from June 1989 until January 2001, when President Bill Clinton lifted this suspension.
  • Overseas Private Insurance Corporation (OPIC): new activities have been suspended since June 1989.
  • Development Bank Lending/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Credits: the United States does not support development bank lending and will not support IMF credits to the PRC except for projects that address basic human needs.
  • Munitions List Exports: subject to certain exceptions, no licenses may be issued for the export of any defense article on the US Munitions List. This restriction may be waived upon a presidential national interest determination.
  • Arms Imports - import of defense articles from the PRC was banned after the imposition of the ban on arms exports to the PRC. The import ban was subsequently waived by the Administration and reimposed on May 26, 1994. It covers all items on the BATFE' Munitions Import List. During this critical period, J. Stapleton Roy, a career US Foreign Service Officer, served as ambassador to Beijing.[71]

In 1996, the PRC conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in an apparent effort to intimidate the Republic of China electorate before the pending presidential elections, triggering the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region. Subsequently, tensions in the Taiwan Strait diminished and relations between the US and the PRC improved, with increased high-level exchanges and progress on numerous bilateral issues, including human rights, nuclear proliferation, and trade. President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in the fall of 1997, the first state visit to the US by a PRC president since 1985. In connection with that visit, the two sides came to a consensus on implementation of their 1985 agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, as well as a number of other issues.[72] President Clinton visited the PRC in June 1998. He traveled extensively in mainland China, and had direct interaction with the Chinese people, including live speeches and a radio show which allowed the President to convey a sense of American ideals and values. President Clinton was criticized by some, however, for failing to pay adequate attention to human rights abuses in mainland China.[73]

Relations were damaged for a time by the United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, which was stated by the White House to be miscoordination between intelligence and the military, although which some Chinese believed to be deliberate. By the end of 1999, relations began to gradually improve. In October 1999, the two countries reached an agreement on compensation for families of those who were victims, as well as payments for damages to respective diplomatic properties in Belgrade and China.

In April 2001, a PRC J-8 fighter jet collided with a US EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft flying south of the PRC in what became known as the Hainan Island incident. The EP-3 was able to make an emergency landing on PRC's Hainan Island despite extensive damage; the PRC aircraft crashed with the loss of its pilot, Wang Wei. It was widely believed that the EP-3 recon aircraft was conducting a spying mission on the Chinese Armed Forces before the collision. Following extensive negotiations resulting in the "letter of the two sorries," the crew of the EP-3 was released from imprisonment and allowed to leave the PRC 11 days later. The US aircraft was not permitted to depart Chinese soil for another three months, after which the relationship between the US and the PRC gradually improved once more.

Bush administration 2001-2009

Presidents George W. Bush, and Hu Jintao with first ladies Laura Bush, and Liu Yongqing wave from the White House in April 2006.

Sino-American relations improved following the September 11 attacks. Two PRC citizens died in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.[74] Chinese companies and individuals sent expressions of condolences to their American counterparts. The PRC offered strong public support for the War on Terror. The PRC voted in favor of UNSCR 1373, publicly supported the coalition campaign in Afghanistan,[75] and contributed $150 million of bilateral assistance to Afghan reconstruction following the defeat of the Taliban. Shortly after 9/11, the US and PRC also commenced a counterterrorism dialogue. The third round of that dialogue was held in Beijing in February 2003.

In the United States, the terrorist attacks greatly changed the nature of discourse. It was no longer plausible to argue, as the Blue Team had earlier asserted, that the PRC was the primary security threat to the United States, and the need to focus on the Middle East and the War on Terror made the avoidance of potential distractions in East Asia a priority for the United States.

There were initial fears among the PRC leadership that the war on terrorism would lead to an anti-PRC effort by the US, especially as the US began establishing bases in Central Asian countries like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and renewed efforts against Iraq. Because of setbacks in America's Iraq campaign, these fears have largely subsided. The application of American power in Iraq and continuing efforts by the United States to cooperate with the PRC has significantly reduced the popular anti-Americanism that had developed in the mid-1990s.

The PRC and the US have also worked closely on regional issues, including those pertaining to North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. The People's Republic of China has stressed its opposition to North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, its concerns over North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and its desire for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. It also voted to refer North Korea's noncompliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency obligations to the UN Security Council.

Taiwan remains a volatile issue, but one that remains under control. The United States policy toward Taiwan has involved emphasizing the Four Noes and One Without. On occasion the United States has rebuked Republic of China President Chen Shui-bian for provocative pro-independence rhetoric. However, in 2005, the PRC passed the Anti-Secession Law which stated that the PRC would be prepared to resort to "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan declared formal independence. Many critics of the PRC, such as the Blue Team, argue that the PRC was trying to take advantage of the US war in Iraq to assert its claims on Republic of China's territory. In 2008, Taiwan voters elected Ma Ying-jeou. Ma, representing the Kuomintang, campaigned on a platform that included rapprochement with mainland China. His election has significant implications for the future of cross-strait relations.[76]

China's president Hu Jintao visited the United States in April 2006.[77] Clark Randt, U.S. Ambassador to China from 2001 to 2008 examined "The State of U.S.-China Relations in a 2008 lecture at the USC U.S.-China Institute.[78]

Obama administration

Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan, center, holds the autographed basketball given to him by President Barack Obama following their Oval Office meeting Tuesday, July 28, 2009, to discuss the outcomes of the first US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Looking on at left is Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo.[79]

The 2008 US presidential election centered on issues of war and economic recession, but candidates Barack Obama and John McCain also spoke extensively regarding US policy toward China.[80] Both favored cooperation with China on major issues, but they differed with regard to trade policy. Obama expressed concern that the value of China's currency was being deliberately set low to benefit China's exporters. McCain argued that free trade was crucial and was having a transformative effect in China. Still, McCain noted that while China might have shared interests with the US, it did not share American values.[81]

Barack Obama's presidency has fostered hopes for increased co-operation and heightened levels of friendship between the two nations. On November 8, 2008, Hu Jintao and Barack Obama shared a phone conversation in which the Chinese President congratulated Obama on his election victory. During the conversation both parties agreed that the development of US-China relations is not only in the interest of both nations, but also in the interests of the world.[82][83][84]

Other organizations within China also held positive reactions to the election of Barack Obama, particularly with his commitment to revising American climate change policy. Greenpeace published an article detailing how Obama's victory would spell positive change for investment in the green jobs sector as part of a response to the financial crisis gripping the world at the time of Obama's inauguration.[85] A number of organizations, including the US Departments of Energy and Commerce, NGOs such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, and universities, have been working with Chinese counterparts to discuss ways to address climate change. Both US and Chinese governments have addressed the economic downturn with massive stimulus initiatives. The Chinese have expressed concern that "Buy American" components of the US plan discriminate against foreign producers, including those in China.[86]

As the two most influential and powerful countries in the world, there have been increasingly strong suggestions within American political circles of creating a G-2 (Chimerica) relationship for the United States and China to work out solutions to global problems together.[87]

Obama meets with Wen Jiabao and members of the Chinese delegation after a bilateral meeting at the United Nations in New York City.

The Strategic Economic Dialogue initiated by then-US President Bush and Chinese President Hu and led by US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi in 2006 has been broadened by the Obama administration. Now called the U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, it is led by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner for the United States and Vice Premier Wang Qishan and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo for China. The focus of the first set of meetings in July 2009 was in response to the economic crisis, finding ways to cooperate to stem global warming and addressing issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and humanitarian crises.[88]

US President Barack Obama visited China on November 15–18, 2009 to discuss economic worries, concerns over nuclear weapon proliferation, and the need for action against climate change.[89] The USC US-China Institute produced a digest of press comments on this visit and on earlier presidential trips.[90]

In January 2010, the US proposed a $6.4 billion arms sale to the Republic of China. In response, the PRC threatened to impose sanctions on US companies supplying arms to Taiwan and suspend cooperation on certain regional and international issues.[91]

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry speaks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, 10 July 2014

On February 19, 2010, President Obama met with the Dalai Lama, accused by China of "fomenting unrest in Tibet." After the meeting, China summoned the US ambassador to China, Jon Huntsman,[92] but Time has described the Chinese reaction as "muted," speculating that it could be because "the meeting came during the Chinese New Year... when most officials are on leave." Some activists criticized Obama for the relatively low profile of the visit.[93]

In 2012, the PRC criticized Obama's new defense strategy, which was widely viewed[by whom?] as aiming to isolate China in the East Asian region.[94] Obama is looking to increase US military influence in the area with a rotating presence of forces in friendly countries.[95]

In March 2012, China suddenly began cutting back its purchases of oil from Iran, along with some signs on sensitive security issues like Syria and North Korea, showed some coordination with the Obama administration.[96]

In March 2013, the US and China agreed to impose stricter sanctions on North Korea for conducting nuclear tests, which sets the stage for UN Security Council vote. Such accord might signal a new level of cooperation between the US and China.[97]

In an effort to build a “new model” of relations, President Obama met President Xi Jinping for two days of meetings, between 6 June and 8 June 2013, at the Sunnylands estate in Rancho Mirage, California.[98] The summit was considered “the most important meeting between an American president and a Chinese leader in 40 years, since Nixon and Mao,” according to Joseph Nye, a political scientist at Harvard University.[99] The leaders concretely agreed to combat climate change and also found strong mutual interest in curtailing North Korea’s nuclear program.[99] However, the leaders remained sharply divided over cyber espionage and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Xi was dismissive of American complaints about cyber security.[100] Tom Donilon, the outgoing U.S. National Security Adviser, stated that cyber security "is now at the center of the relationship,” adding that if China’s leaders were unaware of this fact, they know now.[100]

Relations between the military leadership of the two nations improved in 2013. General Qi said that over the long term the shared interests of the two would outweigh their differences.[citation needed]

In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter warned China to halt its rapid island-building in the South China Sea.[101]

Economic relations

Imports and exports between China and the United States. US data.

The PRC and the US resumed trade relations in 1972 and 1973. Direct investment by the US in mainland China covers a wide range of manufacturing sectors, several large hotel projects, restaurant chains, and petrochemicals. US companies have entered agreements establishing more than 20,000 equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in mainland China. More than 100 US-based multinationals have projects in mainland China, some with multiple investments. Cumulative US investment in mainland China is valued at $48 billion. The US trade deficit with mainland China exceeded $350 billion in 2006 and was the United States' largest bilateral trade deficit.[102] Some of the factors that influence the U.S. trade deficit with mainland China include:

  • US Import Valuation Overcounts China: there has been a shift of low-end assembly industries to mainland China from newly industrialized countries in Asia. Mainland China has increasingly become the last link in a long chain of value-added production. Because US trade data attributes the full value of a product to the final assembler, mainland Chinese value added is overcounted.
  • US demand for labor-intensive goods exceeds domestic output: the PRC has restrictive trade practices in mainland China, which include a wide array of barriers to foreign goods and services, often aimed at protecting state-owned enterprises. These practices include high tariffs, lack of transparency, requiring firms to obtain special permission to import goods, inconsistent application of laws and regulations, and leveraging technology from foreign firms in return for market access. Mainland China's accession to the World Trade Organization is meant to help address these barriers.
  • The undervaluation of the Renminbi relative to the United States dollar.[103]

Beginning in 2009, the US and China agreed to hold regular high-level talks about economic issues and other mutual concerns by establishing the Strategic Economic Dialogue, which meets biannually. Five meetings have been held, the most recent in December 2008. Economic nationalism seems to be rising in both countries, a point the leaders of the two delegations noted in their opening presentations.[104][105][106] The United States and China have also established the high-level US-China Senior Dialogue to discuss international political issues and work out resolutions.

In September 2009 a trade dispute emerged between China and the United States, which came after the US imposed tariffs of 35 percent on Chinese tire imports. The Chinese commerce minister accused the United States of a "grave act of trade protectionism,"[107] while a USTR spokesperson said the tariff "was taken precisely in accordance with the law and our international trade agreements."[107] Additional issues were raised by both sides in subsequent months.[108][109]

Pascal Lamy cautioned: "The statistical bias created by attributing commercial value to the last country of origin perverts the true economic dimension of the bilateral trade imbalances. This affects the political debate, and leads to misguided perceptions. Take the bilateral deficit between China and the US. A series of estimates based on true domestic content can cut the overall deficit – which was $252bn in November 2010 – by half, if not more."[110]

Currency dispute

Monetary policy has been one of the biggest issues surrounding relations between the United States and China within the past decade. At the heart of the issue is the question of whether or not each country’s currency is at the proper value. Each country has placed the blame with the other. Most monetary and trade experts agree that China’s currency has been and is still undervalued,[111] but an article by Business Insider argues that China raising the value of their currency would have a large effect on the trade balance between the two countries.[112][undue weight? ]

Domestic leaders within the United States have pressured the Obama administration to take a hard-line stance against China and compel them to raise the value of their currency. The United States Congress currently has before it a bill which would call on the President to impose tariffs on Chinese imports until China properly values its currency.[107][113] Many Congressional members from states with large manufacturing sectors are leading the push to retaliate against China.[citation needed] The Chinese state newspaper has criticized the United States for unfair monetary policies as well.[citation needed] Both countries have sought out other international partners to side with them.[citation needed]

However, as of 2015, there has been IMF and World Bank reports that the Yuan is now no longer undervalued[why?], refuting US claims of Chinese currency manipulation.[citation needed][original research?][neutrality is disputed]

Chinese perspective on the US economy

China is a major creditor and the largest foreign holder of US public debt[114] and has been critical of US deficits and fiscal policy,[115] advising for policies that maintain the purchasing value of the dollar[116][117] although it had little few options other than to continue to buy United States Treasury bonds.[115] China condemned the US fiscal policy of quantitative easing,[115][118][119] responding to S&P's downgrade of U.S. credit rating, and advised the United States not to continue with the accumulation of debt, concluding with the statement that America cannot continue to borrow to solve financial problems.[120][121][122]

Important issues

Military spending and planning

The PRC's military budget is often mentioned as a threat by many, including the Blue Team.[citation needed] The PRC's investment in its military is growing rapidly. The United States, along with independent analysts, remains convinced that the PRC conceals the real extent of its military spending.[123][124] According to the PRC government, China spent $45 billion on defense in 2007.[125] In contrast, the United States had a $623-billion budget for the military in 2008, $123 billion more than the combined military budgets of all other countries in the world.[126] Some very broad US estimates maintain that the PRC military spends between $85 billion and $125 billion. According to official figures, the PRC spent $123 million on defense per day in 2007. In comparison, the US spent $1.7 billion ($1,660 million) per day that year.[127]

The concerns over the Chinese military budget may come from US worries that the PRC is attempting to threaten its neighbors or challenge the United States. Concerns have been raised that China is developing a large naval base near the South China Sea and has diverted resources from the People's Liberation Army Ground Force to the People's Liberation Army Navy and to air force and missile development.[128] Even still[weasel words], China's military spending is only a fourth of US spending.[125][129]

Andrew Scobell wrote that under President Hu, objective civilian control and oversight of the PLA appears to be weakly applied.[130]

On October 27, 2009, American Defense Secretary Robert Gates praised the steps China has taken to increase transparency of defense spending.[131] In June 2010, however, he said that the Chinese military was resisting efforts to improve military-to-military relations with the United States.[132] Gates has also said that the United States will "assert freedom of navigation" in response to Chinese complaints about United States Navy deployments in international waters near China.[133] Admiral Michael Mullen has said that the United States seeks closer military ties to China, but will continue to operate in the western Pacific.[134]

A recent report stated that five of six US Air Force bases in the area are potentially vulnerable to Chinese missiles and called for increased defenses.[135]

Meanwhile, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists wrote in a 2010 report that the Chinese continue to invest in modernization of their nuclear forces because they perceive that their deterrent force is vulnerable to American capabilities and that further improvement in American missile defenses will drive further Chinese spending in this area.[136]

Chinese defense minister Liang Guanglie has said that China is 20 years behind the United States in military technology.[137]

Vladimir Dvorkin of the Russian Academy of Sciences has said that the USA's missile defense systems pose a real threat to China's nuclear deterrence.[138][unreliable source?][better source needed]

The International Institute for Strategic Studies in a 2011 report argued that if spending trends continue China will achieve military equality with the United States in 15–20 years.[139]

China and the United States have been described as engaging in a race of military technology. Expansion and development of new weapons by China has been seen as so threatening as to cause planning for withdrawal of US forces from close proximity to China, dispersal of US bases in the region, and development of various new weapon systems.[citation needed][original research?] China is also developing capacity for attacking satellites and for cyberwarfare.[140] Amitai Etzioni of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies has said that in response to China’s increased military spending, the United States has adopted an escalatory military posture, which is typified by the AirSea Battle concept. He has expressed concern that the United States’ approach, which includes ordering additional weapons systems and restructuring military forces, could lead to "an arms race with China, which could culminate in a nuclear war."[141][page needed]

In 2012, it was reported that the United States would invite a team of senior Chinese logisticians to discuss the possibility of a first-ever logistics cooperation agreement between the two countries.[142]

Professor James R. Holmes, Chinese specialist at the U.S. Naval War College, has said that China's investments towards a potential future conflict are closer to those of the United States than may first appear, because the Chinese understate their spending, the internal price structures of the two countries are different, and the Chinese only need to concentrate on projecting military force a short distance from their own shores. The balance may shift to the advantage of the Chinese very quickly if they continue double digit yearly growth while the Americans and their allies cut back.[143]

In line with power transition theory, the idea that "wars tend to break out...when the upward trajectory of a rising power comes close to intersecting the downward trajectory of a declining power," some have argued that conflict between China, an emerging power, and the United States, the reigning superpower, is all but inevitable.[144] However, the current leadership in China shows no sign of holding an expansionist ideology and Chinese leaders use the phrase "China's peaceful rise" to describe the country's trajectory.[citation needed][original research?] Furthermore, a number of domestic challenges in China, including environmental degradation, political corruption, and the increasing quality of life demands of the emerging middle class, may prevent China from pursuing an aggressive foreign policy or taking on the global hegemony

  1. REDIRECT Template:POV-statement of the United States anytime soon.[citation needed][original research?] If that is the case, a policy of accommodation, as opposed to containment, on the part of the U.S. may decrease the likelihood of conflict between the two countries.[145][page needed]

Human rights

File:China statue of liberty cartoon.jpg
China Daily published a cartoon of a shadowed Statue of Liberty holding a tape recorder and microphone instead of a tablet and torch

In 2003, the United States declared that despite some positive momentum that year and greater signs that the People's Republic of China was willing to engage with the US and others on human rights, there was still serious backsliding. China has acknowledged in principle the importance of protection of human rights and has claimed to have taken steps to bring its own human rights practices into conformity with international norms. Among these steps are the signing of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in October 1997, ratified in March 2001, and signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in October 1998, which has not yet been ratified. In 2002, China released a significant number of political and religious prisoners and agreed to interact with United Nations experts on torture, arbitrary detention, and religion. However, international human rights groups assert that there has been virtually no movement on these promises,[citation needed] with more people being arrested for similar offences since. Such groups maintain that China still has a long way to go in instituting the kind of fundamental systemic change that will protect the rights and liberties of all its citizens in mainland China. The US State Department publishes an annual report on human rights around the world, which includes an evaluation of China's human rights record.[146][147]

In a decision that was criticized by human rights groups, the State Department did not list China as one of the world's worst human rights violators in its 2007 report of human rights practices in countries and regions outside the United States.[148] However, the then-assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Jonathan D. Farrar stated that China's overall human rights record in 2007 remained poor.[148]

Since 1998, China has annually published a White Paper detailing the human rights abuses by the United States[149][150][151] and since 2005 has also published a White Paper on its own political system and democratic progress.[152][153]

On February 27, 2014[154] the United States released its China report on human rights practices for 2013 which, according to its executive summary, described the PRC as an authoritarian state and a place in which repression and coercion were routine.[155] On February 28, 2014, China published a report on human rights in the United States citing surveillance on its own citizens, mistreatment of inmates, gun violence, and homelessness despite having a vibrant economy as important issues.[154]

Influence in Asia

China's economic rise has led to some geo-political friction between the US and China in the East Asian region.[156] For example, in response to China's response to the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong by North Korea, "Washington is moving to redefine its relationship with South Korea and Japan, potentially creating an anti-China bloc in Northeast Asia that officials say they don't want but may need." [157] For its part, the Chinese government fears a US Encirclement Conspiracy.[158][better source needed]

According an article published on Jura Gentium, Journal of Philosophy of International Law and Global Politics, there is a "new Sphere of Influence 2"[159] shaped mainly by China and the US. Even on social media, if the Western, Japanese and South Korean events and daily life are linked through Facebook, Chinese and American habits and customs are disconnected lacking in social media sharing.[citation needed][original research?] This strategy to avoid American influences through social networks is preserved[neutrality is disputed] by the Chinese government.

In response to increased American drone strikes against militants on Pakistan's border areas during the Obama administration, the PRC has offered additional fighter jets to Pakistan.[160][better source needed]

Countries in Southeast Asia have responded to Chinese claims for sea areas by seeking closer relations with the United States.[161] American Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has said that in spite of budget pressures, the United States will expand its influence in the region, in order to counter China's military buildup.[162]

On 7 June 2013, Denny Roy, a senior fellow at the East–West Center in Honolulu, argued in The Diplomat that the United States and China must stop striving for trust and instead emphasize verification.[163] "The argument that trust leads to peace is built on the premise that the suspicions between China and the U.S. are unfounded and would evaporate with more and deeper dialogue. Unfortunately, however, at least some of these suspicions are all too warranted."[163] Whether international law should govern regional affairs in Asia; whether China should be allowed to make expansive sovereignty claims; and what the future strategic roles of South Korea and Japan should be, are issues that, according to Roy, are irreconcilable between China and the U.S.[163] Strategic trust, therefore, is not attainable. "The two countries should strive to manage their inevitable bilateral strategic tensions by reaching agreements where both see a benefit and where compliance is measurable. . . for these inherent rivals and potential adversaries, the emphasis belongs on 'verify,' not 'trust.'"[163]

See also



  1. "Clinton seeks stronger Asia ties". BBC News. February 16, 2009. Retrieved April 7, 2010.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  2. "USC US-China Institute: Ambassador Clark Randt on "The Crucial Relationship"". Retrieved December 2, 2010.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  3. "World Economic Outlook". International Monetary Fund. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved October 12, 2014.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  4. Kruger, Daniel (May 15, 2013). "China Retains Position as the Largest Foreign Creditor of the U.S." Bloomberg. Retrieved December 10, 2014.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  5. "China says confrontation with US would be disaster". BAsia Bulletin. Retrieved 10 July 2014. Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  6. "". Pew Research Center. External link in |title= (help); |access-date= requires |url= (help)<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  7. "China's opinion of the United States". Pew Research Center. Retrieved 19 May 2015.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  8. 8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 8.05 8.06 8.07 8.08 8.09 8.10 8.11
  9. 9.00 9.01 9.02 9.03 9.04 9.05 9.06 9.07 9.08 9.09 9.10
  10. "Population by sex, annual rate of population increase, surface area and density" (PDF). United Nations Statistics Division.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3
  13. "A GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES' HISTORY OF RECOGNITION, DIPLOMATIC, AND CONSULAR RELATIONS, BY COUNTRY, SINCE 1776: CHINA". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved May 2, 2015. Mutual Recognition, 1844. Formal recognition by the United States of the Empire of China, and by the Empire of China of the United States, came on or about June 16, 1844, when U.S. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Caleb Cushing presented his credentials and met with Chinese official Qiying to discuss treaty negotiations. Prior to this, the United States had dispatched consuls to Guangzhou as early as 1784—the first was Samuel Shaw, the supercargo on the Empress of China—but these had never been formally received by Chinese officials as state representatives. The two countries had acknowledged each other’s existence before 1844, but the negotiations and treaty of that year marked the first recognition under international law.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  14. Sheila Melvin (May 2, 2015). "Fateful Ties Gordon Chang presents a panoramic sweep of the U.S.- China relationship dating back to the Revolutionary War" (book review). Caixin. Retrieved May 2, 2015. American interest in China remained strong and largely positive into the middle of the 1800s – but it was not reciprocated. Chang quotes a description of America from the Chinese official who signed the first diplomatic treaty with the U.S., in 1844:<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  15. "English language text of the Treaty of Nanking". 1964-10-16. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  16. William R. Braisted, "The United States and the American China Development Company," Far Eastern Quarterly 11 (1952): 147-165.
  17. Paul A. Varg, "The Myth of the China Market, 1890-1914," American Historical Review (1968) 73#3 pp. 742-758 in JSTOR
  18. Robert A. Bickers, Robert A. Bickers, The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1800–1914 (London: Allen Lane, 2011)
  19. Michael H. Hunt, "The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal," Journal of Asian Studies 31 (Spring 1972): 539–559.
  20. Madeline Y. Hsu, "Chinese and American Collaborations through Educational Exchange during the Era of Exclusion, 1872–1955," Pacific Historical Review (2014) 83#2 pp. 314-332 in JSTOR
  21. "Text of the first Open Door note, to Germany". 1964-10-16. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  22. Yoneyuki Sugita, "The Rise of an American Principle in China: A Reinterpretation of the First Open Door Notes toward China" in Richard J. Jensen, Jon Thares Davidann, and Yoneyuki Sugita, eds. Trans-Pacific relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the twentieth century (Greenwood, 2003) pp 3–20 online
  23. Youli Sun and You-Li Sun, China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931-1941 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.)
  24. Pearl S. Buck (1938), The Chinese Novel: Lecture Delivered before the Swedish Academy at Stockholm, December 12, 1938, by Pearl S. Buck.
  25. See Laura Tyson Li, Madame Chiang Kai-Shek : China's Eternal First Lady (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).
  26. Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 412. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  27. 27.0 27.1 Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 464. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  28. Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 413. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  29. Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 504. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  30. Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 226. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  31. Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 256. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  32. Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 414. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  33. Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 413. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  34. Frederic E. Wakeman (2003). Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese secret service. University of California Press. p. 75. ISBN 0-520-23407-3. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  35. Jonathan Fenby (2005). Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. Carroll & Graf Publishers. p. 460. ISBN 0-7867-1484-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  36. "The Chinese People Have Stood Up! 1949". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  38. Sheng v. Rogers, District of Columbia Circuit Court, 1959-10-06, retrieved 2010-02-27<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  39. “Telegram from the U.S. Pacific Command to the Department of State and the White House” In Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980. vol. 13 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 680-686.
  40. Peter R. Moody (1977). Opposition and dissent in contemporary China. Hoover Press. p. 302. ISBN 0-8179-6771-0. Retrieved 2010-11-30.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  41. Nançy Bernkopf Tucker (1983). Patterns in the dust: Chinese-American relations and the recognition controversy, 1949–1950. Columbia University Press. p. 181. ISBN 0-231-05362-2. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  42. Jay Taylor (2000). The Generalissimo's son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the revolutions in China and Taiwan. Harvard University Press. p. 195. ISBN 0-674-00287-3. Retrieved 2010-06-28.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  43. Charles Ford Redick, “The Jurisprudence of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: Chinese Claims.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 67, no. 4 (Oct. 1973) pp. 728
  44. Malkasian, Carter (2001). The Korean War: Essential Histories. Osprey Publishing. p. 16.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  45. Cohen, Eliot A; Gooch, John (2005). Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. Free Press. pp. 165–195. ISBN 0-7432-8082-2.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  46. The Royal Łazienki Museum in Warsaw. Warsaw, Poland: Royal Łazienki Museum in Warsaw. 2014. p. 125. ISBN 978-83-64178-18-4.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  47. United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Semiannual Report to Congress 1966. China Claims Program
  48. “Home After Long Detention in China,” New York Times. 11/26/1954. Pg. 12
  49. Pamela G. Hollie “Thaw in China-U.S. Ties May Unfreeze ’49 Assets.” New York Times. 1/10/1979. Pg. D1
  50. Dunbabin, J.P.D. (1996). International relations since 1945 ([Nachdr.]. ed.). London [u.a.]: Longman. p. 255. ISBN 0-582-49365-X.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  51. Goh, Evelyn, Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally' , Cambridge University Press, 2005
  52. Leffler, edited by Melvyn P.; Westad, Odd Arne (2010). The Cambridge history of the Cold War (1. publ. ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 373. ISBN 978-0-521-83720-0.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  53. Dube, Clayton. "Getting to Beijing: Kissinger's Secret 1971 Trip". USC US-China Institute. Retrieved 24 July 2011.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  54. Dube, Clayton. "Sports diplomacy and back channel negotiations". "Talking Points, July 22-August 3, 2011". USC US-China Institute. Retrieved 24 July 2011.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  55. Magaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed The World (2008)
  56. Nixon, Richard. "Announcement of the President's Trip to China". US-China documents collection. USC US-China Institute. Retrieved 24 July 2011.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  57. See "Getting to know you: The US and China shake the world" and "The Week that Changed the World" for recordings, documents, and interviews.
  58. 58.0 58.1 Dunbabin, J.P.D. (1996). International relations since 1945 ([Nachdr.]. ed.). London [u.a.]: Longman. p. 258. ISBN 0-582-49365-X.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  59. Jeffrey A. Engel, ed. (2011). The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a Global President. Princeton UP. p. 356.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  60. Jon Meacham (2015). Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush. p. 219.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  61. Vance, Cyrus (1983). Hard Choices. Simon and Schuster. pp. 78–79.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  62. Jim Mann, About face: A history of America's curious relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (1999).
  63. "US-China Institute :: news & features :: china in u.s. campaign politics: part 6 of election '08 and the challenge of china". 1964-10-16. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  64. Michel Oksenberg, "Reconsiderations: A Decade of Sino-American Relations." Foreign Affairs 61.1 (1982): 190.
  65. Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Brookings Institution Press, 2004).
  66. ss text
  67. Steven M. Goldstein, and Randall Schriver, "An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act." China Quarterly 165 (2001): 147-172. online
  68. Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Brookings Institution Press, 2004.)
  69. Wesley S. Roehl, "Travel agent attitudes toward China after Tiananmen Square." Journal of Travel Research 29.2 (1990): 16-22.
  70. David Skidmore and William Gates. "After Tiananmen: The struggle over US policy toward China in the Bush administration." Presidential Studies Quarterly (1997): 514-539. in JSTOR
  71. Text and video of J. Stapleton Roy's 2007 talk at the USC US-China Institute about the state of US-China relations
  72. U.Hawaii, 1997
  73. Eckholm
  74. Chi Wang (2008). George W. Bush and China: Policies, Problems, and Partnerships. Lexington Books.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  75. "U.S. State Department - China (03/03)". Retrieved 2011-06-06.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  76. "US-China Institute :: news & features :: usci symposium explores the taiwan vote". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  77. "Text of Pres. Bush's welcome". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  78. "Click here for a streaming video version of the lecture". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  79. "Details and video from the meeting". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  80. Video and documents: Obama and China [1]; McCain and China [2].
  81. The Economist 8 June 2013
  82. "President Hu Jintao and US President-elect Barack Obama Discuss over Telephone - Hunan Government". 2008-11-09. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  83. "No call from Obama seen as slight to India". 2008-11-11. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  85. "Barack Obama – can he fix the economy by fixing the environment? | Greenpeace East Asia". 2008-11-19. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  86. "US-China Institute :: news & features :: making american policy toward china - scholars and policy makers on economics, security, and climate change". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  87. Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace. "Foreign Policy Association: Resource Library: Viewpoints: Moving the G-2 Forward". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  88. "US-China Institute :: news & features :: economic crisis, looming environmental threats, and growing nuclear weapons worries - all in a day's work at the strategic and economic dialogue ä¸ç¾Žæˆ˜ç•¥ä¸Žç»?济对è¯?". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  89. The aims and challenges of the trip were summarized by the USC US-China Institute: [3], [4].
  90. "Instant Analysis: Reporting on US Presidents in China". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  91. "China hits back at US over Taiwan weapons sale". BBC News. 2010-01-30. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  92. Macartney, Jane (2010-02-19). "China summons US Ambassador over Dalai Lama's meeting with Obama". London: The Times. Retrieved 2010-07-12.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  93. Ramzy, Austin (2010-02-19). "In China, Muted Reaction to Dalai Lama's Visit". Time magazine. Retrieved 2010-07-12.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  94. Lee, Mj. "China fires at new U.S. defense plan." Politico, 9 January 2012.
  95. Whitlock, Craig. "Philippines may allow greater U.S. military presence in reaction to China’s rise." Washington Post, January 25, 2012.
  96. Mark Landler and Steven Lee Myers (26 April 2012). "U.S. Sees Positive Signs From China on Security Issues". The New York Times. Retrieved 9 November 2012.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  97. "China-U.S. Accord Sets UN Vote on North Korea Sanctions". Bloomberg.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  98. Calmes, Jackie and Steven Lee Myers (8 June 2013). "U.S. and China Move Closer on North Korea, but Not on Cyberespionage". The New York Times. Retrieved 11 June 2013.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  99. 99.0 99.1 Sanger, David E. (9 June 2013). "Obama and Xi Try to Avoid a Cold War Mentality". The New York Times.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  100. 100.0 100.1 McGregor, Richard (10 June 2013). "Obama-Xi summit presented as a walk in the park". Financial Times. Retrieved 11 June 2013.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  101. "Defense secretary’s warning to China: U.S. military won’t change operations". The Washington Post. 27 May 2015.
  102. Graph showing US-China trade [5]; source [6]
  103. "''World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007''". 2006-09-14. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  104. Wu Yi, PRC Vice Premier
  105. Henry Paulson, Jr., US Treasury Secretary
  106. Video on trade tensions
  107. 107.0 107.1 107.2 "Obama's Tire Tariff Draws Beijing's Ire". Bloomberb Businessweek. 2010-09-13.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  108. "Statistics on world trade, list of US-China WTO complaints". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  109. China slaps deposits/tariffs on US steel exports; US politicians rant about China [7]
  110. Lamy, Pascal (24 January 2011). "'Made in China' tells us little about global trade". Retrieved 7 July 2012.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  113. "House panel cranks up pressure on China currency". Reuters. 2010-09-24.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  114. "Foreign Holdings of Treasuries as of May, 2011".<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  115. 115.0 115.1 115.2 Barboza, David (2011-08-06). "China Condemns U.S. "Addiction to Debts"". The New York Times.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  116. Foster, Peter (2009-03-13). "Chinese premier Wen Jiabao worried about US debt". The Daily Telegraph. London.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  117. "Update: China calls for global cooperation on debt risks". Reuters. 2011-08-05.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  118. [8]
  119. [9]
  120. Jamieson, Alastair (2011-08-06). "China Calls for New Global Reserve Currency". The Daily Telegraph. London.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  121. Pierson, David (2011-08-06). "China Chastises U.S. Over Debt". Los Angeles Times.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  122. Fred E. Jandt (2012). An Introduction to Intercultural Communication: Identities in a Global Community. SAGE. p. 103.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  123. [10] Archived December 6, 2004 at the Wayback Machine
  124. "Rumsfeld questions China spending". BBC News. October 18, 2005. Retrieved April 7, 2010.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  125. 125.0 125.1 "china's military spends hundreds of millions of dollars". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  126. John Pike. "World Wide Military Expenditures". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  127. "china's military spends hundreds of millions of dollars". Archived from the original on February 2, 2009. Retrieved 2010-12-02. Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (help)<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  128. Harding, Thomas (May 1, 2008). "Chinese nuclear submarine base". The Daily Telegraph. London. Retrieved April 7, 2010.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  129. SIPRI military expenditure database Archived November 29, 2006 at the Wayback Machine
  130. "Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China's Peaceful Rise?" (PDF). Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  131. Luce, Dan De (2009-10-26). "Time to end 'on-again-off-again' US-China ties: Pentagon". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  132. Entous, Adam (2010-06-03). "Gates says China's PLA may be trying to thwart ties". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  133. Miles, Donna. "Gates Cites Encouraging Trends Regarding Iran, China." "American Forces Press Service", 8 November 2010
  134. Pessin, Al. "US Wants Better Military Ties to China, But Will Continue Pacific Operations." Voice of America, 1 Dec 2010.
  135. Capaccio, Tony. "Chinese Missiles Could Close U.S. Bases in Attack, Report Says." Bloomberg, 11 November 2010
  136. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen "Chinese nuclear forces, 2010." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
  137. Minnick, Wendell. "PLA 20 Years Behind U.S. Military: Chinese DM." Defense News, 7 June 2011.
  138. Bridge, Robert. "‘China more at risk from US AMD plans in Pacific’." RT, 28 December 2011.
  139. "East-West military gap rapidly shrinking: report", By Peter Apps, Reuters, Tue Mar 8, 2011
  140. China Takes Aim at U.S. Naval Might, JULIAN E. BARNES, NATHAN HODGE, and JEREMY PAGE, Wall Street Journal, JANUARY 4, 2012
  141. Etzioni, Amitai. "Who Authorized Preparations for War with China?" Yale Journal of International Affairs, June 2013. [11]
  142. Miles, Donna. "U.S., China to Consider Sharing Resources during Joint Missions." American Forces Press Service, 12 October 2012.
  143. "What to Make of China’s Defense Spending Increase."
  144. Kagan, Robert (2012). The World America Made. New York: Knopf. p. 90.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  145. Etzioni, Amitai (April–May 2012). "Accommodating China". Survival. 55 (2).<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  146. US State Department report on global human rights, March 11, 2008
  147. US State Department report on global human rights, February 25, 2009
  148. 148.0 148.1 Cooper, Helen (March 12, 2008). "U.S. Drops China From List of Top 10 Violators of Rights". NYT.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  149. "2002 PRC White Paper on US Human Rights Abuses". 2002-03-11. Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  150. 2008 PRC White Paper on US Human Rights Abuses
  151. 2009 PRC White Paper on US Human Rights Abuses
  152. 2005/10/19 (2005-10-19). "China issues 1st white paper on democracy(10/19/05)". Retrieved 2010-12-02.CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  153. "White Paper on China's Political System, 2007". Retrieved 2010-12-02.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  154. 154.0 154.1
  155. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)". U.S. Department of State.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  156. New York Times, 2010 Sept. 22, "U.S. Influence in Asia Revives Amid China’s Disputes,"
  157. Pomfret, John. "U.S. steps up pressure on China to rein in North Korea." Washington Post, 6 December 2010.
  158. Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. "Beijing's Alarm Over New 'US Encirclement Conspiracy'." Jamestown Foundation, 12 April 2005
  159. Peccia, T., 2014, "The Theory of the Globe Scrambled by Social Networks: A New Sphere of Influence 2.0", Jura Gentium - Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto Internazionale e della Politica Globale, Sezione "L'Afghanistan Contemporaneo",
  160. Donald, David. "Report: China To Provide JF-17s to Pakistan." AINonline, 6 June 2011.
  161. Slavin, Erik. "China's claim on sea leads Asian neighbors to strengthen ties with U.S." Stars and Stripes, 27 June 2011.
  162. Entous, Adam. "Pentagon Will Add to Asia Operations." Wall Street Journal, 26 October 2011.
  163. 163.0 163.1 163.2 163.3 Roy, Denny (7 June 2013). "U.S.-China Relations: Stop Striving For "Trust"". The Diplomat. Retrieved 20 June 2013.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>

Further reading


  • Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (2010) excerpt and text search
  • Dulles, Foster Rhea. China and America: The Story of Their Relations Since 1784 (1981), general survey
  • Feis, Herbert. The China Tangle (1967), diplomacy during World War II
  • Foot, Rosemary. The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (1995), excerpt and text search
  • Gedalecia, David. "Letters From the Middle Kingdom: The Origins of America's China Policy," Prologue, 34.4 (Winter, 2002), pp. 260–273.
  • Greene, Naomi. From Fu Manchu to Kung Fu Panda: Images of China in American Film (University of Hawai'i Press; 2014) 288 pages; explores the changing image of China and the Chinese in the American cultural imagination, beginning with D.W. Griffiths's Broken Blossoms (1919).
  • Li, Jing. China's America: The Chinese View the United States, 1900-2000. (State University of New York Press, 2011)
  • Mackerras, Colin. "China and the Australia-US Relationship: A Historical Perspective." Asian Survey (2014) 54#2 pp: 223-246.
  • MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: the week that changed the world (2008).
  • Mann, James. About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (2000) excerpt and text search
  • Pederson, William D. ed. A Companion to Franklin D. Roosevelt (2011) online pp 590–611, covers American diplomacy in WW2
  • Riccards, Michael P. The Presidency and the Middle Kingdom (2000)
  • Rose, Robert S. et al. Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (2002)
  • Song, Yuwu, ed. Encyclopedia of Chinese-American Relations (McFarland, 2006)
  • Sutter, Robert G. U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present (2010) excerpt and text search
  • Sutter, Robert G. Historical Dictionary of United States-China Relations (2005) excerpt and text search
  • Tuchman, Barbara. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (1971)
  • Wang, Dong. The United States and China: A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present (2013) 390pp


  • Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Simon Shen, eds. Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations: Change and Continuity, Causes and Cures (Routledge, 2015)
  • Davis, Samuel R. Out flying the eagle: China's drive for domestic economic innovation and its impact on US-China relations (MA thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014) online
  • Foot, Rosemary; Walter, Andrew (2012). China, the United States, and Global Order. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521725194.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  • Friedberg, Aaron L. (2011). A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. W.W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-06828-3.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  • Goldstein, Avery. "First things first: the pressing danger of crisis instability in US-China relations." International Security (2013) 37#4 pp: 49-89. online
  • Mann, Jim. About face: A history of America's curious relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (Knopf, 1999)
  • Men, Jing, and Wei Shen, eds. The EU, the US and China - Towards a New International Order? (2014) excerpt and text search
  • Roach, Stephen S. Unbalanced: the codependency of America and China (Yale UP, 2015)
  • Shambaugh, David, ed. (2012). Tangled Titans: The United States and China. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1442219700.<templatestyles src="Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css"></templatestyles>
  • Schoen, Douglas E. and Melik Kaylan. Return to Winter: Russia, China, and the New Cold War Against America (2015)
  • Steinberg, James, and Michael E. OHanlon, eds. Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton University Press, 2014)
  • Wheeler, Norton. Role of American NGOs in China's Modernization: Invited Influence (Routledge, 2014) 240 pp. online review
  • Yan, Xuetong. "The Instability of China–US Relations." The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2010) 3#3 pp: 263-292. online
  • Zhang, Biwu. Chinese Perceptions of the U.S.: An Exploration of China's Foreign Policy Motivations (Lexington Books; 2012) 266 pages; Chinese views of America's power, politics, and economics, as well as the country as a source of threat or opportunity.
  • Zhao, Quansheng. "America's response to the rise of China and Sino‐US relations." Asian Journal of Political Science 13.2 (2005): 1-27, after 1990

Primary sources

See also

External links

Website of diplomatic missions

U.S. State Department

Foreign Relations Series

  1. 1964-1968
  2. 1969–1972
  3. 1973-1976, ePub Supplement
  4. 1977-1980

Other Links