DomainKeys Identified Mail

DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) is an email authentication method designed to detect email spoofing by providing a mechanism to allow receiving mail exchangers to check that incoming mail from a domain is authorized by that domain's administrators. In technical terms, DKIM is a technique to authorize a domain to associate its name to an email message through cryptographic authentication.

Verification is carried out using the signer's public key published in the DNS. A valid signature guarantees that some parts of the email (possibly including attachments) have not been modified since the signature was affixed. Usually, DKIM signatures are not visible to end-users, and are affixed or verified by the infrastructure rather than message's authors and recipients. In that respect, DKIM differs from end-to-end digital signatures.

History

DKIM is the result of merging two similar efforts, in 2004. This merged specification has been the basis for a series of IETF standards-track specifications and support documents which eventually resulted in STD 76, currently RFC 6376.

Aspects of DomainKeys, along with parts of Identified Internet Mail, were combined to create DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), which is now widely used.

Trendsetting providers implementing DKIM include Yahoo, Gmail, AOL and FastMail. Any mail from these organizations should carry a DKIM signature.

DomainKeys

DomainKeys (DK) is a deprecated email authentication method designed by Yahoo to verify the DNS domain of an e-mail sender and the message integrity.

Both DomainKeys and DKIM were published in May 2007, DomainKeys as an "historical" protocol, and DKIM as its standards-track replacement.

Identified Internet Mail

Identified Internet Mail (IIM) was the Cisco Systems® proposed signature-based mail authentication standard.

Development

The original DomainKeys was designed by Mark Delany of Yahoo! and enhanced through comments from many others since 2004. It is specified in Historic RFC 4870, superseded by Standards Track RFC 4871, DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures; both published in May 2007. A number of clarifications and conceptualizations were collected thereafter and specified in RFC 5672, August 2009, in the form of corrections to the existing specification. In September 2011, RFC 6376 merged and updated the latter two documents, while preserving the substance of the DKIM protocol. Public key compatibility with the earlier DomainKeys is also possible.

DKIM was initially produced by an informal industry consortium and was then submitted for enhancement and standardization by the IETF DKIM Working Group, chaired by Barry Leiba and Stephen Farrell, with Eric Allman of sendmail, Jon Callas of PGP Corporation, Mark Delany and Miles Libbey of Yahoo!, and Jim Fenton and Michael Thomas of Cisco Systems attributed as primary authors.

Source code development of one common library is led by The OpenDKIM Project, following the most recent protocol additions, and licensing under the New BSD License.

Overview

DKIM provides for two distinct operations, signing and verifying. Either of them can be handled by a module of a mail transfer agent (MTA). The signing organization can be a direct handler of the message, such as the author, the submission site or a further intermediary along the transit path, or an indirect handler such as an independent service that is providing assistance to a direct handler. Signing modules insert one or more DKIM-Signature: header fields, possibly on behalf of the author organization or the originating service provider. Verifying modules typically act on behalf of the receiver organization, at each hop.

The need for this type of validated identification arose because spam often has forged addresses and content. For example, a spam message may claim to be from sender@example.com, although it is not actually from that address or domain or entity, and the spammer's goal is to convince the recipient to accept and to read the email. It is difficult for recipients to establish whether to trust or distrust any particular message or even domain, and system administrators may have to deal with complaints about spam that appears to have originated from their systems but did not. DKIM specification allows signers to choose which header fields they sign, but the From: field must always be signed.

DKIM is independent of Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) routing aspects in that it operates on the RFC 5322 message—the transported mail's header and body—not the SMTP envelope defined in RFC 5321. Hence the DKIM signature survives basic relaying across multiple MTAs.

DKIM allows the signer to distinguish its legitimate mail stream. It does not directly prevent or disclose abusive behavior. This ability to distinguish legitimate mail from potentially forged mail has benefits for recipients of e-mail as well as senders, and "DKIM awareness" is programmed into some e-mail software.

How it works

The DKIM-Signature header field consists of a list of tag=value parts. Tags are short, usually only one or two letters. The most relevant ones are b for the actual digital signature of the contents (headers and body) of the mail message, bh for the body hash, d for the signing domain, and s for the selector. The default parameters for the authentication mechanism are to use SHA-256 as the cryptographic hash and RSA as the public key encryption scheme, and encode the encrypted hash using Base64.

The receiving SMTP server uses the domain name and the selector to perform a DNS lookup. For example, given the signature

DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.net; s=brisbane;
     c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; l=1234; t=1117574938; x=1118006938;
     h=from:to:subject:date:keywords:keywords;
     bh=MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY3ODkwMTI=;
     b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZ
              VoG4ZHRNiYzR

A verifier queries the TXT resource record type of brisbane._domainkey.example.net. There are no CAs nor revocation lists involved in DKIM key management, and the selector is a straightforward method to allow signers to add and remove keys whenever they wish—long lasting signatures for archival purposes are outside DKIM's scope. Some more tags are visible in the example:

• v is the version,
• a is the signing algorithm,
• c is the canonicalization algorithm(s) for header and body,
• q is the default query method,
• l is the length of the canonicalized part of the body that has been signed,
• t is the signature timestamp,
• x is its expire time, and
• h is the list of signed header fields, repeated for fields that occur multiple times.

Note that the DKIM-Signature header field itself is always implicitly included in h, with the value of the b tag treated as though it were an empty string.

The data returned from the query is also a list of tag-value pairs. It includes the domain's public key, along with other key usage tokens and flags. The receiver can use this to then decrypt the hash value in the header field and at the same time recalculate the hash value for the mail message (headers and body) that was received. If the two values match, this cryptographically proves that the mail was signed by the indicated domain and has not been tampered with in transit.

Signature verification failure does not force rejection of the message. Instead, the precise reasons why the authenticity of the message could not be proven should be made available to downstream and upstream processes. Methods for doing so may include sending back an FBL message, or adding an Authentication-Results header field to the message as described in RFC 7001.

Patent encumbrance

DomainKeys is covered by U.S. Patent 6,986,049 assigned to Yahoo! Inc. For the purpose of the DKIM IETF Working Group, Yahoo! released the now obsolete DK library under a dual license scheme: the DomainKeys Patent License Agreement v1.2, an unsigned version of which can still be found, and GNU General Public License v2.0 (and no other version).

Advantages

The primary advantage of this system for e-mail recipients is it allows the signing domain to reliably identify a stream of legitimate email, thereby allowing domain-based blacklists and whitelists to be more effective. This is also likely to make some kinds of phishing attacks easier to detect.

There are some incentives for mail senders to sign outgoing e-mail:

• It allows a great reduction in abuse desk work for DKIM-enabled domains if e-mail receivers use the DKIM system to identify forged e-mail messages claiming to be from that domain.
• The domain owner can then focus its abuse team energies on its own users who actually are making inappropriate use of that domain.

Use with spam filtering

DKIM is a method of labeling a message, and it does not itself filter or identify spam. However, widespread use of DKIM can prevent spammers from forging the source address of their messages, a technique they commonly employ today. If spammers are forced to show a correct source domain, other filtering techniques can work more effectively. In particular, the source domain can feed into a reputation system to better identify spam. Conversely, DKIM can make it easier to identify mail that is known not to be spam and need not be filtered. If a receiving system has a whitelist of known good sending domains, either locally maintained or from third party certifiers, it can skip the filtering on signed mail from those domains, and perhaps filter the remaining mail more aggressively.

Anti-phishing

DKIM can be useful as an anti-phishing technology. Mailers in heavily phished domains can sign their mail to show that it is genuine. Recipients can take the absence of a valid signature on mail from those domains to be an indication that the mail is probably forged. The best way to determine the set of domains that merit this degree of scrutiny remains an open question; DKIM has an optional feature called ADSP that lets authors that sign all their mail self-identify, but the effectiveness of this approach is questionable, and ADSP was demoted to historic status in November 2013

Working with eBay and PayPal, Google has effectively utilized DKIM in GMail in such a way that any e-mail that claims to be coming from ebay.com or PayPal.com will not be accepted at all if it cannot be verified successfully with DKIM. Such messages won't even appear in the Spam folder. Heavily phished domains that deserve such treatment are few in number, far less than those who publish strict policies.

Compatibility

Because it is implemented using DNS records and an added RFC 5322 header field, DKIM is compatible with the existing e-mail infrastructure. In particular, it is transparent to existing e-mail systems that lack DKIM support.

This design approach also is compatible with other, related services, such as the S/MIME and OpenPGP content-protection standards. DKIM is compatible with the DNSSEC standard and with SPF.

Protocol overhead

DKIM requires cryptographic checksums to be generated for each message sent through a mail server, which results in computational overhead not otherwise required for e-mail delivery. This additional computational overhead is a hallmark of digital postmarks, making sending bulk spam more (computationally) expensive. This facet of DKIM may look similar to hashcash, except that the receiver side verification is not a negligible amount of work.

Weaknesses

The RFC itself identifies a number of potential attack vectors.

DKIM signatures do not encompass the message envelope, which holds the return-path and message recipients. Since DKIM does not attempt to protect against mis-addressing, this does not affect its utility. A concern for any cryptographic solution would be message replay abuse, which bypasses techniques that currently limit the level of abuse from larger domains. Replay can be inferred by using per-message public keys, tracking the DNS queries for those keys and filtering out the high number of queries due to e-mail being sent to large mailing lists or malicious queries by bad actors. For a comparison of different methods also addressing this problem see e-mail authentication.

Arbitrary forwarding

As mentioned above, authentication is not the same as abuse prevention. An evil email user of a reputable domain can compose a bad message and have it DKIM-signed and sent from that domain to any mailbox from where he can retrieve it as a file, so as to obtain a signed copy of the message. Usage of l tag in signatures makes doctoring such messages even easier. The signed copy can then be forwarded to million recipients, for example through a botnet, without control. The email provider who signed the message can block the offending user, but cannot stop the diffusion of already signed messages. The validity of signatures in such messages can be limited by always including an expiration time tag in signatures, or by revoking a public key periodically or upon a notification of an incident. Effectiveness of the scenario can hardly be limited by filtering outgoing mail, as that implies the ability to detect if a message might potentially be useful to spammers.

Content modification

DKIM currently features two canonicalization algorithms, simple and relaxed, neither of which is MIME-aware. Mail servers can legitimately convert to a different character set, and often document this with X-MIME-Autoconverted header fields. In addition, servers in certain circumstances have to rewrite the MIME structure, thereby altering the preamble, the epilogue, and entity boundaries, any of which breaks DKIM signatures. Only plain text messages written in us-ascii, provided that MIME header fields are not signed, enjoy the robustness that end-to-end integrity requires.

The OpenDKIM Project organized a data collection involving 21 mail servers and millions of messages. 92.3% of observed signatures were successfully verified, a success rate that drops slightly (90.5%) when only mailing list traffic is considered.

Annotations by mailing lists

The problems might be exacerbated when filtering or relaying software makes changes to a message. Without specific precaution implemented by the sender, the footer addition operated by most mailing lists and many central antivirus solutions will break the DKIM signature. A possible mitigation is to sign only designated number of bytes of the message body. It is indicated by l tag in DKIM-Signature header. Anything added beyond the specified length of the message body is not taken into account while calculating DKIM signature. This won't work for MIME messages.

Another workaround is to whitelist known forwarders, e.g. by SPF. For yet another workaround, it was proposed that forwarders verify the signature, modify the email, and then re-sign the message with a Sender: header. However, it should be noted that this solution has its risk with forwarded 3rd party signed messages received at SMTP receivers supporting the RFC 5617 ADSP protocol. Thus, in practice, the receiving server still has to whitelist known message streams.

Short key vulnerability

In October 2012, Wired reported that mathematician Zach Harris detected and demonstrated an email source spoofing vulnerability with short DKIM keys for the google.com corporate domain, as well as several other high profile domains. He stated that authentication with 384-bit keys can be factored in as little as 24 hours "on my laptop," and 512-bit keys, in about 72 hours with cloud computing resources. Harris found that many organizations sign email with such short keys; he factored them all and notified the organizations of the vulnerability. He states that 768-bit keys could be factored with access to very large amounts of computing power, so he suggests that DKIM signing should use key lengths greater than 1,024. Wired stated that Harris reported, and Google confirmed, that they began using new longer keys soon after his disclosure. According to RFC6376 the receiving party must be able to validate signatures with keys ranging from 512 bits to 2048 bits, thus usage of keys shorter than 512 bits might be incompatible and shall be avoided. The RFC6376 also states that signers must use keys of at least 1024 bits for long-lived keys, though long-livingness is not specified there.

See also

• Email authentication
• Author Domain Signing Practices
• Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC)
• DomainKeys
• E-mail authentication
• OpenPGP
• S/MIME
• Sender Policy Framework
• Vouch by Reference

Further reading

• RFC 4686 Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
• RFC 4871 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures Proposed Standard
• RFC 5617 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Author Domain Signing Practices (ADSP)
• RFC 5585 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Service Overview
• RFC 5672 RFC 4871 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures—Update
• RFC 5863 DKIM Development, Deployment, and Operations
• RFC 6376 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures Draft Standard
• RFC 6377 DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) and Mailing Lists

External links

• DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
• IETF DKIM working group (started 2006, concluded 2011)
• Internet Messaging Leaders Work Together to Fight Email Fraud
• DKIM Software and Services Deployment Reports
• DKIM-Reputation Project Open reputation data on sender domains

External links to online tools

• Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) DNS Record Generator

External links to implementations and howtos

• DKIM implementation for .NET (MIT license)
• DKIM implementation for quick integration with javamail (BSD license)
• DKIM Signature and verification using DKIMproxy DKIM protocol description and integration with Postfix on Debian
• DKIM signer/verifier drop-in replacement for qmail-queue
• OpenDKIM Open source DKIM library, and signing/verifying filter for Sendmail and Postfix
• libdkim++ Open source DKIM C++ library
• Perl's Mail::DKIM
• DKIM signing and validation plugin for Qpsmtpd
• Exim Documentation: Support for DKIM (DomainKeys) de:DomainKeys