Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems

v t e Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems
	Monotonic	Condorcet	Majority	Condorcet loser	Majority loser	Mutual majority	Smith	ISDA	LIIA	Clone independence	Reversal symmetry	Participation, Consistency	Later-no‑harm	Later-no‑help	Polynomial time	Resolvability	MinMax
Schulze	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ranked pairs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Kemeny-Young	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Copeland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Nanson	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Instant-runoff voting	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Borda	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baldwin	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Bucklin	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Plurality	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contingent voting	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coombs^[1]	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
MiniMax	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Anti-plurality^[1]	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Sri Lankan contingent voting	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Supplementary voting	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dodgson^[1]	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

↑ ^1.0 ^1.1 ^1.2 Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as $\tfrac{1}{2}$ A > B > C and $\tfrac{1}{2}$ A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then Later-no-harm and Later-no-help are not applicable.

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